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ABSTRACT
The thesis at hand analyzes an aspect of the emergence of zeppelin air-
ships in Germany during the first decade of the 20th century. Partic-
ularly the engagement of a broad public to support the development
of the zeppelin technology by financial aid is a point that is taken un-
der scrutiny. The interest for this question emerges from the fact that
hardly any return was to be expected for supporters. It thus comes to
mind to ask why people would engage if no return is to be expected.
Furthermore the question is interesting to study because the support
for Count Zeppelin, the inventor behind the airship, emerged rather
quickly after years of relative disinterest.
Using the methodology of Social Construction of Technology (SCOT),
the author explores how this technology eventually became very pop-
ular after having been widely ignored for years. The research focuses
on the timespan around the general public’s turning from a skepti-
cal to a very supportive attitude after the crash of a prototype in the
summer of 1908.
Additionally to the SCOT approach, the concept of Sociotechnical
Imaginaries is introduced and combined with SCOT methodology in
order to enhance the capabilities of the analysis. Sociotechnical imagi-
naries provide a particular understanding for the role time and future-
bound expectations played in the support of the technology.
The analysis concludes that a combination of technological progress
in terms of the reliability and capability of the airships themselves as
well as a fit with the social and political events of the time formed
the basis for a very fast change in peoples’ perception of it in the
summer of 1908. Furthermore, it is observed that the zeppelin devel-
opment did also profit from an inner political conflict in Germany at
the time. While not being an actual part of it, it was used as a means
to demonstrate the people’s resistance against Wilhelminian monar-
chy, which led to a stronger support than there might have been for
solely technological reasons.
Moreover, the study contributes to the use of SCOT for the descrip-
tion of technological development by successfully integrating some
sociotechnical imaginaries, the attempt to reach a more detailed anal-
ysis in terms of both the timely character of elements at work in the
process and the emergence of those elements in the first place.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Entwicklung von Zeppelin-
Luftschiffen in Deutschland anfangs des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts.
Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf dem Zusammenspiel von Gesell-
schaft und technologischer Entwicklung, besonders der finanziellen
Unterstützung des Projektes durch eine breite Öffentlichkeit. Aus der
Tatsache, dass Unterstützer keinen persönlichen Vorteil zu erwarten
hatten ergibt sich die Frage, warum sie Graf Zeppelin unterstützten.
Außerdem ist interessant, warum sich diese Unterstützung nach Jah-
ren relativen Desinteresses vergleichsweise schnell entwickelte.
Unter Verwendung des SCOT (Social Construction of Technology)
- Ansatzes wird untersucht wie diese Technologie nach Jahren des
Schattendaseins binnen relativ kurzer Zeit zu großer Popularität ge-
langte. Die Untersuchung konzentriert sich dabei auf die Zeit um den
Sommer 1908, zu der das öffentliche Desinteresse in breit angelegte
Unterstützung umschlug.
Zusätzlich zu SCOT finden so genannte Sociotechnical Imaginaries
Verwendung. Dieser Ansatz erlaubt in der Kombination mit SCOT
eine weitergehende Analyse. Insbesondere die Bedeutung von Zeit-
lichkeit und zukunftsgerichteten Erwartungen für den Prozess der
Technologieentwicklung können so besser abgebildet werden.
Die Analyse kommt zu dem Schluss dass die Veränderung in der
Wharnehmung des Zeppelins in der Öffentlichkeit auf eine Kombi-
nation mehrerer Faktoren zurückzuführen ist. Zum einen technologi-
sche Fortschritte was die Zuverlässigkeit und Leistungsfähigkeit der
Luftschiffe betrifft, zum anderen ein Zusammentreffen mit vorteilhaf-
ten sozialen und politischen Umständen im Sommer des Jahres 1908.
Außerdem ist festzustellen dass der Zeppelin von politischen Span-
nungen profitierte, in denen er jedoch genutzt wurde, um Stimmung
gegen die Wilhelminische Monarchie zum Ausdruck zu bringen, wo-
von dieser wiederum profitierte.
Außer den Beiträgen zur Geschichte des Zeppelins leistet die vor-
liegende Arbeit darüber hinaus einen Beitrag zur Verwendung von
SCOT zur Betrachtung technologischer Entwicklungsprozesse. Durch
die Integration von Sociotechnical Imaginaries wird es ermöglicht zeit-
liche Aspekte, eine Dimension die von SCOT nicht zentral behandelt
wird, sowie deren Entstehung besser in die Betrachtungen der tech-
nologischen Entwicklung einzubeziehen.
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Ein ehrenhafter Projektmacher ist jedoch der,
welcher seine Idee nach den klaren und deutlichen
Grundsätzen des gesunden Menschenverstandes,
der Ehrlichkeit und Klugheit
in angemessener Weise ins Werk setzt,
darlegt, worauf er hinaus will,
nicht in fremde Taschen greift,
sein Projekt selbst ausführt und
sich mit dem wirklichen Erzeugnis als Gewinn seiner Erfindung begüngt.
— Daniel Defoe [10, 112]
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Part I
INTRODUCT ION & FOUNDAT IONS

1
INTRODUCT ION
The zeppelin is one of the best-known technological artifacts of the
20th century. At its time, it was a groundbreaking step in aeronautics
and thereby the human dream of flight becoming reality. Its pioneer-
ing accomplishment of overcoming gravity in combination with its
characteristic shape made it an iconic technology that anyone recog-
nizes. Even a century of its innovation, it still attracts attention. As
the screenshot from my own Facebook-newsfeed shows, its appear-
ance still seems to be worthwhile noticing and sharing with others.
Spontaneously, only few other technological artifacts come in mind
that would attract such attention.
Figure 1: Screenshot from Facebook
Its development, however, shared
the contingency of many oth-
ers: it was at stake several times
and its success, the appreciation
by many and the introduction
as an artifact of everyday use
highly unlikely. However great
the technology may appear in
retrospect, its development was
all but a straight, linear success
story – even though it might fre-
quently be told as such. From
an economical perspective, the
project should have been aban-
doned and have run out of fund-
ing several times and thus never
have made it to where it actually went. The technology was a fail-
ure at first and yet succeeded at last. By failure I refer to the lack
of reliability, safety and controllability that made the first prototypes
crash and let an everyday application appear unlikely as the zeppelin
appeared to be very dangerous. The thesis at hand tries to contribute
to a better understanding of how it became what it is remembered as
today despite these initial problems. It draws closely on the circum-
stances of its development and the factors that enabled it. Thereby, it
aims at contributing to both historical studies of technology as well
as the social science literature on the development of technology.
Flying has been mankind’s dream ever since. Balloons, developed
in Europe in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century were among
the first technological developments that made this dream come true.
Invented by the French brothers Montgolfier in 1783, the technique
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was soon refined and in the 19th century developed from a mere
curiosity into a useful artifact: they were used for military reconnais-
sance. In this context, a man who turned out to change their develop-
ment encountered them for the first time: Ferdinand Count Zeppelin,
then serving in the German military, saw balloons as an observer of
the American civil war. Fascinated by this experience his interest
in aviation was sparked. After his retirement from military service,
Zeppelin turned his passion into a serious pursuit. His main goal
was overcoming the major flaw of the balloons he had encountered
earlier in his life: their inability to maneuver. Building on existing
experimental concepts, he developed a concept for an airship with
an inflexible hull during the 1890s. Rejected by the government, Zep-
pelin found himself in a classical projector’s position: pursuing his
idea mostly on own costs, he developed a first prototype (the term
projector is used here in its historical meaning as denomination for
someone pursueing and promoting projects, a term discussed in chap-
ter 6). On July 2nd, 1900, 10 years after starting his endeavor, his first
prototype, 128meters long Luftschiffbau Zeppelin (LZ)-1 (all his ships
were named LZ for »Luftschiffbau Zeppelin« and their serial number)
took off under the eyes of thousands of spectators. However, its oper-
ation did not convince investors of its potential and Zeppelin, out of
funds, had to disassemble his prototype and sell its part as well as his
entire tools and workshop. The next chance came only in 1906, when
donations and income from a raffle enabled Zeppelin to make another
effort to promote his invention. In January of 1906, LZ-2 crashed on
its first flight. LZ-3, finally, became the first airship of actual success.
Having travelled about 4,000 km on 45 flights, it caught the attention
of the military and was bought by the German army. The army in-
tended to also buy the next airship produced. However, it was asked
for the ship to be tested prior to its entry into military service. On
that test flight, LZ-4 also crashed and was destroyed. Count Zeppelin
was left broke once again. Of his 4 machines built, 2 had been lost
and just one made it into continuous service. What seems to be a
final point for his technology was in fact not. When LZ-4 crashed
near Stuttgart, thousands of spectators who had come to watch the
zeppelin spontaneously started to collect money for the count to con-
tinue his project. They started a fundraising campaign at whose end
they would have raised over 6,000,000 Goldmarks, at the time a huge
sum. It was handed to Count Zeppelin in order for him to pursue the
development of airships further. He founded Luftschiffbau Zeppelin
GmbH and the Zeppelin foundation. Despite ongoing difficulties and
the loss of more than half the airships built soon after their commis-
sioning, the zeppelin eventually succeeded; over 100 of them were
put into military service during World War 1. In the 1920s, zeppelins
were the first vehicles able to offer intercontinental flights and grew
to a previously unimagined size.
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The zeppelin became an iconic and celebrated technology that is
remembered and capable of attracting attention until today. This fact
alone makes it wothwhile studying. As already observed by Hecht
[20, 254], »technologies serve[d] as important symbols for national
identity [. . . ]. The relationship between technological change and na-
tional identity went both ways.« Particularly the early setbacks for
the technology and the turn to its success and the incorporation of a
national symbol are very interesting. In my thesis, I want to take a
look at how the perception of the zeppelin and its technological de-
velopment proceeded. Most importantly, however, I want to observe
in which way the forming of a shared perception of the technologies
fed back to its development - and also influenced the society in which
it took place. Studying the relation of science, technology and society,
it is of course a focus of my interest whether the perception in society
and the development of the technology were related to each other.
As I found, especially the early days of this technology were a very
interesting history of ups and downs. Particularly the events around
the crash of LZ-4 in 1908 and the national donation following it do in-
dicate there has been a relation between the two. And while there are
plenty of narratives of what happened and who did what, I found
a conclusive reflection on the basis of theoretical considerations as
social sciences try to give to be missing.
I hope to be able to contribute to this field of literature in a way
that works on this niche that seems still to be empty. Trying to do
so, I will run the risk of just running down the beaten path: narra-
tives about the development of Zeppelin airships are manifold and a
standard narrative has evolved. However, I do not want to re-tell this
story just once more. Instead, I want to apply theoretical concepts
the Science, Technology, Society (STS) community has developed in
order to gain new insights on the emergence and stabilization of a
technology. Particularly, I want to use a Social Construction of Tech-
nology (SCOT) [2, 3, 40] approach to show how different publics have
been involved into the process of developing this technology and how
this involvement has affected the development of the zeppelin. Albeit
SCOT has been around for more than twenty, almost thirty years, its
basic assumptions are still the same. While there have been some ef-
forts to broaden its perspective, some aspects are still not a focus of
the theoretical approach. In my opinion, however, SCOT might very
well benefit from connections to other schools of thoughts. In this
work I try to combine it with some recent work by Sheila Jasanoff,
her concept of Sociotechnical Imaginaries (STI) [27, 14]. Thereby I
want to integrate time, a dimension not regarded much by SCOT, into
the set of considerations that play a role in technology development.
Moreover, Jasanoff provides strong arguments on how ’technical’ and
’social’ influence each other. She offers explanations on how social
and technological developments not only influence each other in a
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unidirectional matter but how those processes run reciprocally. Uti-
lizing this approach, I expect to be able to argue a strong case on how
the social environment influenced the zeppelin development on the
one hand, but also how the zeppelin exercised strong power on the
society on the other hand. This argument, as mentioned in the last
paragraph, will be a central piece of this work.
As SCOT is not the newest of paradigms, by the combination with
STI I want to relate it to some recent theoretical considerations. This
way, I hope to be able to provide both to the history of the zeppelin
airship as well as to the STS field. Furthermore, the analysis and the
many observations can be used for a different task - to portray count
Zeppelin as a heterogeneous engineer [4, 34]. While that perception
is not going to be a focus of my analysis, it comes implicit with my
theoretical framework. When it is assumed that technological devel-
opment underlies social influences, it is only consequential to assume
the inventor is going to promote his technology and not remain pas-
sive about it. Thus I am going to at least mention the concept at some
points in order to deal with Zeppelin’s role more adequately.
My thesis is separated in three parts. Part I contains three chapters:
this introduction (chapter 1) is followed by chapters 2 and 3. Chapter
2 contains some backgound knowledge about the subject of my re-
search: both Count Zeppelin the inventor as well as the development
of his technology are presented along general lines. Furthermore,
the reader is introduced to different literature bodies on the subject.
Chapter 3 develops the research interest out of the existing material
and specifies what the aim of this thesis will be. Part II consists of
3 chapters, too. Chapter 4 presents the technological framework that
is going to be used for the analysis. The concepts mentioned above
(mainly SCOT and STI) are explained further and their use discussed
in detail. Chapter 5 introduces the methods used to conduct the ac-
tual analysis and the materials that are examined. Chapter 6 is the
main piece of analysis itself. After examining exemplary concepts
associated with zeppelins, it is analyzed how the zeppelin and its
perception developed. Part III concludes the piece with a summary
of the results of the analysis and their reflection through the theory
in chapter 7. Furthermore, it contains a reflection upon the thesis’
achievements but also its limitations and remaining or new questions
that wait for further research.
2
L ITERATURE & BACKGROUND INFORMAT ION
Before digging deep into some detailed aspects of the development
of Zeppelin’s airships, I believe it to be necessary - or at least very
helpful - to provide a short introduction to the subject. As it will
be explicated in chapter 3, my primary goal is not to unveil new
facts about Zeppelin or his airship. Nor am I going to write the
thousandth piece on the man or his invention - there is plenty of
works covering those issues already. Instead, I want to use the story
of how the zeppelins came into being as a case to showcase some STS
concepts. While applying STS conceptions on it might also provide
new insights into the developments around Zeppelin and his airship,
my primary goal lies elsewhere: as mentioned in the introduction, the
main focus is to give a thorough explanation of how different, mainly
social, factors influenced the technology development and how the
technology development fed back to those factors. Both SCOT and STI
are going to provide new insights; as this perspective is apparently
missing in the discourse so far, this structured approach is what I am
trying to accomplish. Hence the historic part of this thesis stays with
shared narratives: The history around Zeppelin and his technology
given below are widely agreed on. It is the standard narrative that has
formed over decades that the phenomenon has been re-examined by
many and been told over and over again. The same is true for other
historic accounts about the time and society the events I write about
took place in. Here, too, I used available literature to draw a picture
to illustrate my case, without arguing whether or not the common
narratives about this time are authentic or not. Nevertheless, I find it
necessary to introduce the reader to those narratives. As most likely
not every reader is familiar with this particular part of history, I want
to provide some background knowledge. Therefore, I will give a
brief overview over the events that led to the development of airships
by count Zeppelin on the following pages. Then, I will give some
insights into the first steps of the technology development, which led
to the point my analysis is going to focus on.
Accounts about Count Zeppelin are virtually unanimous in respect
to the most important points regarding the man, his life and his work.
Almost all of them base widely on a biography by Hugo Eckener. [11]
At least this holds true for those that are commonly referred to as
sources for further writings about some facet of the zeppelin and
that are encountered in virtually any bibliography of pieces about
zeppelins. Eckener was a trained journalist, long lasting companion
of count Zeppelin as well as his successor (who actually brought the
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airships to the sophistication they are remembered for today). His im-
portant book »Graf Zeppelin – Sein Leben nach eigenen Aufzeichnungen
und persönlichen Erinnerungen« [11] is seminal to approaches to Zep-
pelin and his work. Despite its lack of documented sources, it is by far
the richest source of knowledge about the person of Count Zeppelin.
First of all, it contains a vast amount of first hand accounts from Eck-
ener, who was a close companion to Zeppelin from the early days of
his invention to his death. Secondly, Eckener was one of only two
biographers (the other one was Hans von Schiller) who had access to
the personal diaries of Zeppelin. Zeppelin has written those journals
meticulously during his entire life. His heirs, however, keep them
under lock and key – a fact much lamented by Zeppelin researchers.
By the combination of his personal knowledge about Zeppelin and
the access to Zeppelin’s journals, Eckener provides a unique insight
into the life and work of Count Zeppelin. A certain positive bias of
the author is of course to be assumed; nevertheless his biography is
to be treated as valuable material. It is probably one of, if not the
trustworthiest account about Zeppelin and his airships in terms of
accuracy and precise interpretation. As a consequence of this, most
biographies on Zeppelin rely on this piece. Although this is not nec-
essary a good sign, as mentioned above, my work is not trying to
challenge this standard narrative. In the context of recreating a time-
line of events it should be unproblematic – and is unavoidable any-
way. I use some additional pieces that will be introduced later, yet
stick mainly to Eckener’s narrative.
2.1 count zeppelin’s biography and background
Figure 2: Portrait of Count Zeppelin
Zeppelin’s background is important for sev-
eral reasons. As he started constructing air-
ships not before the age of 52, his prior life
contains quite a lot interesting aspects that
also play a role in his later career as an in-
ventor. To begin with, his origin contains
some issues that become relevant later. Fur-
thermore, the course of his first career as a
military officer and its end became a leading
influence on Zeppelin – and on the way the
Prussian administration treated him when
appealing for support for his project. He
was born as Ferdinand Adolf Heinrich Au-
gust Graf von Zeppelin in Konstanz, Ger-
many on July 8th, 1838. His parents were
Friedrich, administrator in service of a local
noble court and Amélie, daughter of a wealthy industrialist family.
Zeppelin grew up at his family’s estate Schloss Girsberg in Switzer-
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land. While stemming from a centuries-old lineage of nobility, his fa-
ther’s line did not provide wealth but a very traditional and socially
respected background. His mother’s lineage, however, a wealthy
industrialist family, provided financial means and a completely dif-
ferent, liberal mindset. As a recent biographer [49, 795] notes, his
mother’s father had given Girsberg as a present to his parents – so
ironically, the family’s aristocratic lifestyle was financed by bourgeois
money. His education is described as broad and very down to earth:
as a boy, Zeppelin worked on the estate in all kinds of roles, herding
cattle, serving in a pub, etc. but also being taught fencing and shoot-
ing by his father. He was thus brought up in both conscience of his
noble roots and patriotism as Württembergian as well as liberal influ-
ences of his mother [11]. In 1855, he joined Württemberg’s military.
By that time, Germany as a nation did not yet exist but was noth-
ing more than a confederation (German Confederation, »Deutscher
Bund« in German) of a multitude of different regional states - one of
those was Württemberg. His career was exemplary and he became a
famous war hero after a spectacular success of a reconnaissance mis-
sion in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870/1871 in which Württemberg
fought as an ally to Prussia. This war led to the unification of Ger-
many as a national state by founding the German Empire in Versailles
on January 18th, 1871. From 1882 until 1885 Zeppelin was command-
ing officer of a cavalry regiment in Ulm, where he was made colonel
in 1884. From 1885 on, he was military attaché to the envoy of Würt-
temberg in Berlin and became his successor as envoy in 1887. Filling
this position for two years, he returned into military service in 1889.
As a patriotic Swabian he regarded the Prussian dominance in the
newly founded empire with suspicion. When Germany as nation-
state came into being after the Franco-Prussian war of 1871, Prussia
had taken the leading role in the newly formed country. Having
grown up in Württemberg and served as military officer during his
entire career (and not only fighting alongside Prussians but also dur-
ing the German war of 1866, in which Württemberg fought alongside
Austria against and was defeated by Prussia), his Württembergian ori-
gin did not serve him well in the Prussian-led German Reich. One of
his last acts as envoy was the writing of an essay harshly criticizing
the Prussian command over the united German army – ultimately
putting Württembergian military under Prussian control [11, 98 f.].
This piece caused uproar in Berlin, up to the emperor himself criti-
cizing Zeppelin [49, 798]. As a consequence of the disapproval his
remarks caused, Zeppelin was displaced from the command post he
had returned to after his service as envoy and was retired against his
will. After a bad outcome in a review of his command – presumably
as a reaction of the administration to his writing [11, 101 ff.] – he had
to resign from military service in 1890 at age 52.
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His discharge was a dire shock for Zeppelin. The dishonorable
end of his military career left him devastated yet formed the starting
point of his second career as airship builder. He was hurt deeply by
the ignorance of his decades of loyal service and had a hard time ac-
cepting it. This event became a turning point of his life. Some old
biographies, however, skip this episode, as it does not fit too well into
the shining picture they draw of Zeppelin and his life. By doing so,
however, they miss a key event to understanding the motivations of
Zeppelin in his later pursuits. It left him with an even more compli-
cated relationship towards Prussia. One can say he was torn: On the
one hand, his suspicions towards Prussia and Prussia’s dominance in
the political system of the German empire were greatly strengthened.
During his future attempts to gain official’s support for his airship
project he felt treated unfair for political reasons frequently. On the
other hand, he desperately tried to regain his reputation and show
‘the Prussians’ what he was capable of - no matter how great his de-
spise for Prussia and the way he felt treated, he wanted to regain their
respect and esteem at all cost.
After his discharge, count Zeppelin focused on airship construction.
First records about building airships in his diary can be traced back
to 1874 [11, 104]. A first letter to the king of Württemberg stating
Zeppelin’s opinion that one needed to build airships for military pur-
poses was written by him in 1887 [11, 106]. He especially mentions
the shortcomings of balloons and argues for airships as those would
preserve the use of balloons while eliminating their major flaw, the
missing maneuverability. So having had airships in mind for quite
some time, he made these occasional games of thought his main oc-
cupation from 1890 onwards. Although he was having a very hard
time to find support for his project, he filed his first patent in 1895. It
took him another five years to the first ascent of one of his airships,
LZ-1. However, it took his airships several more years to gain the reli-
ability needed for regular service. Until then, he had to build several
prototypes of which most crashed for one reason or another and he
ran out of funds more than once. His project was perceived as just
one of hundreds of foolish attempts to subdue nature and he was
ridiculed for quite some time. Human flight was the technological
frontier of the time and thus challenged by many. Of those, most
failed and were soon forgotten. Zeppelin was soon put into that cate-
gory - especially as for his fame as a war hero he was to some extent
a publicly known figure.
This fame was both a burden and a help: On the one hand, it pro-
vided a public awareness that increased the stakes for him - for Zep-
pelin the project did not only hold the potential to make him famous,
it also held the potential to destroy whatever was left of his reputa-
tion. On the other hand not being just anybody helped him a lot to
be listened to in the first place. As Eckener points out, all the commis-
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sions that Zeppelin later felt bullied and unfairly rejected by had only
been installed because of his personal history in the first place (origi-
nal quote: »So ist die Atmosphäre von vorneherein nicht günstig, und
man darf offen zugeben, daß es dem Grafen niemals gelungen wäre,
die Kommission auf die Beine zu bringen, wenn er eben nicht der
Graf Zeppelin gewesen wäre, dessen soziale Stellung, dessen Charak-
ter und bekannte Leistungen als Soldat seinen Bemühungen einen
gewissen Nachdruck verliehen.« [11, 123]). Especially with the break-
through of his technology in 1908,
Figure 3: Cartoon portraial of Zep-
pelin
however, he became a popular hero. Em-
peror Wilhelm II went from calling him the
‘dumbest of all southern-Germans’ to call-
ing him the greatest German of the century
(original quotes: »Der dümmste aller Süd-
deutschen« and »den größten Deutschen
des Jahrhunderts«. The regional empha-
sis can be seen as a good example for
regional conflicts in the German empire
that Zeppelin’s resentments towards Prussia
stemmed from – and illustrate the reserva-
tions between Prussia andWürttemberg that
came to light in Zeppelin’s essay mentioned
above. Other reports use a slightly differ-
ent phrasing, ‘of all the southern-Germans
the dumbest’, original quote »Von Allen
Süddeutschen der dümmste«, which empha-
sizes general Prussian reservations towards
southern Germans even more.) [11, 164].
The cartoon (Figure 3) nicely shows that
change: while Zeppelin is depicted as a
grand old gentleman, the balloon he is hold-
ing is a reference to both his airship and
the former connotation of it being a foolish
– maybe pretty but useless – thing.
Following those events, after the 24-hour
test and the national donation Zeppelin expanded his operations
and built an airship dockyard and founded an airline (Deutsche
Luftschiffahrts-Aktiengesellschaft (DELAG), the first airline world-
wide to go to regular operations). Eventually he came to witness
his airships in combat operations, which he had envisioned them for,
during World War I. He died in Berlin on March 8th, 1917.
2.2 count zeppelin’s airships : a brief overview
Like for Zeppelin’s biography, there is a standard narrative concern-
ing the technological development of Zeppelin’s airship itself.
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This one, however, is a bit more complex in terms of how it came
into being. Much of it also relies on Eckener’s biography - as the
development of his airship was Zeppelin’s most famous achievement,
his biography is rich in terms of information on the airship itself. Zep-
pelin built his first ship LZ-1 in 1900. Having found some industrial
sponsors and contributing half the funds himself (a practice that was
quite common – as Wengenroth [51] emphasizes, cartels and mutual
support were very common among entrepreneurs in Germany at that
time), LZ-1 was built and was able to take off for its maiden flight on
July 2nd, 1900. However, Zeppelin’s company ran out of funds and
had to disassemble the ship later that year [11, 143]. Having been
damaged on its first flight, the ship had to be repaired and could
only fly two more times in October of the same year – one of the
main reasons for the bankruptcy, Knäusel [30, 42] adds. While the
maiden flight caught lots of attention, these events were too scarce
as to spark a wave of enthusiasm like the one experienced later. Af-
ter several years of struggle for funding, Zeppelin was able to build
his second ship, LZ-2 in 1905 and first ascended with this ship on
November 30th, 1905. On its second flight on January 17th, 1906,
the dirigible suffered an engine failure and thus became a balloon.
Subsequently, a storm carried it away and it crashed into mountains
near Kißlegg, about 40 kilometers northeast of Friedrichshafen [11,
151]. The third zeppelin, LZ-3, eventually became the first prototype
to fulfill the expectations in it to a considerable degree: It first flew on
October 9th, 1906 [11, 153] and finally proved the value of Zeppelin’s
concept. It was capable of flying almost 100 kilometers with speed
of around 40 kilometers per hour (Eckener speaks of 11 to 12 meters
per second [11, 153]. The German military was willing to purchase
the ship and an additional one, LZ-4, that was yet to be built. Stille,
LZ-4 was supposed to prove its reliability on a 24-hour flight before
the two ships were to be taken into military service. Zeppelin tested
LZ-4 successfully prior to this 24-hour flight. Its maiden flight took
place on June 20th, 1908. Having taken the ship to a surprising cruise
over Switzerland on July 1st 1908, the airship had been seen by thou-
sands before the ambitious 24-hour endurance test was to take place.
The trip over Switzerland had not only surprised the Swiss but also
the German public and the press as well. Triumphant accounts of
this test made the general public aware and curious of the newest of
Zeppelin’s airships. Especially the international reactions to the lat-
est achievement of the zeppelin made the German public curious and
anticipatory. The 24-hour test was to take place from August 4th to
5th, 1908 [11, 159]. On the route of the ship, life stood still: hundreds
of thousands in the cities below (Basel, Strasbourg, Mannheim and
others) watched the zeppelin in fascination. To explain this curiosity,
fascination and excitement, one should keep in mind that to this day,
most witnesses had heard of and fantasized about flying machines
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but had never seen a technical object – and by no means one of over
120 meters in length – fly in their entire life. Apart from that, analy-
sis of this fascination for the ship by Frank [15] comes to conclusions
agreeing with what Eckener thought about the ship: the aesthetics of
form and material of the ship were very appealing (»Ich habe immer
das Gefühl gehabt, dass solche Wirkungen, wie sie vom Zeppelin-
Luftschiff ausgingen, zu einem großen Teil auf ästhetischen Empfind-
ungen beruhten«, [12, 403]). Further factors that played a role are
the subject of my analysis and will be analyzed in later chapters as I
think those reasons given above are not all there is to tell about that
issue. Particularly the step from passive admiration to active support
seems to have drawn upon more than just an appealing exterior and
the fact this appealing shape was flying. This point is going to be
revisited later on as its key to my analysis. The 24-hour test had to be
paused once due to a defect near Mainz and then to be canceled after
about 3/4 of the scheduled distance because of a failing engine after
all. Therefore, the ship landed in Echterdingen near Stuttgart. The
site was chosen because nearby the Daimler workshops, responsible
for the zeppelin’s engines, were located. Thus, Zeppelin hoped for a
quick and easy repair. A storm in the afternoon of August 5th, how-
ever, destroyed the ship. It caught fire and burned down completely
before the ship could be fixed [11, 161]. Similarly to what happened
to the famous LZ-129 »Hindenburg« 28 years later at Lakehurst, New
Jersey, early zeppelins were filled with easily flammable hydrogen
and hence very vulnerable to fire. The destruction of LZ-4 put an
end to the endurance test without having fulfilled the military’s con-
ditions for purchasing LZ-3 and LZ-4. It seemed like the final failure
of his project, and Zeppelin was prepared to burry his dream at this
point.
But his fate turned fast: within hours after the crash, all over Ger-
many a grassroots-movement started to donate money for Zeppelin.
During the past weeks and culminating in his test flight that day, his
endeavor was no longer seen as a foolish attempt but as a project of
national pride. Eckener makes a remark about the pride with which
the zeppelin was regarded after the trip over Switzerland (original
quote: »Das deutsche Volk las mit ungeheurem Stolz die Berichte
über den Eindruck, den sie auf die ganze Welt gemacht hatte.« [11,
159]. Within 24 hours, hundreds of thousands of Marks were donated
to von Zeppelin, adding up to over 6 million Marks after a couple of
weeks [11, 163]. This »miracle at Echterdingen« [16, 18] became the
turning point for Zeppelin’s endeavor: finally equipped with suffi-
cient funds, he was able put together an actual corporation and found
subsidiaries to supply the actual airship construction with parts and
know-how. As the military’s willingness to buy ships stayed small,
DELAG, the world’s first airline was founded in order to purchase
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Figure 4: ’Why the ascent failed’
and use zeppelins and keep
the airship production running.
Furthermore, DELAGoperations
had two major purposes: for
starters, they would bring air-
ships to the entire country, feed-
ing the people’s demand to
actually see what ’they’ had
funded by their donation [9,
1] cites Eckener as speaking
of »Millions of shareholders«) –
hence providing an abstract re-
turn for their donations. Fur-
thermore DELAG operations in-
creased the experience operat-
ing airships very fast. Still suf-
fering heavy losses in terms of
airships (only few lives were
lost) in the beginning, the tech-
nology became safer and more
manageable quickly as the expe-
rience in its handling increased.
The losses after the Echterdin-
gen miracle were tolerable for
Zeppelin as the capital backing
through the national donation
was comfortably high. The pub-
lic, too, took the setbacks with-
out turning away from the tech-
nology – there were even hu-
morous interpretations of the re-
peated losses of airships (see the
cartoon in Figure 4, indicating
the cheering masses caused the winds that damaged the airship in
the picture.).
The army finally purchased several ships, and the final breakthrough
was achieved when the navy – under Tirpitz (who despised airships
[11, 171]) the most fostered and most expensive military branch –
changed its policy [11, 180]. While having tried to build a fleet to
equal Britain’s in the years before, this goal had to be put into per-
spective if not abandoned. After ten years of massive efforts it be-
came obvious that this goal could not be reached. Instead airships
were taken into consideration as a potentially game-changing tech-
nology. During World War I, however, airships proved to be much
less effective weapons than expected: Relatively slow but big (one of
the factors that led to the aesthetic attraction described above, as the
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low relation of speed and own length is responsible for the majestic
appearance) they were easy to hit targets at the front. Bombing raids
to Britain proved to be possible yet to be very ineffective. Navigation
was a big issue; airship crews weren’t even able to tell which city they
were bombing. Additionally, many ships were lost - crew losses were
actually higher than the casualties caused on the British side. In the
end, airship operations were discontinued even before the end of the
war. Zeppelin himself had seen the failure of his technology (and
the increasing potential of developing airplanes) coming. During the
last years of his life, he promoted and funded plane developments
for several years before dying in 1917 [11, 182 f.]. With the Versailles
treaty, construction of airships was forbidden. It took several years
for the struggling company (manufacturing other goods in the mean
time) to begin building airships again (now under Hugo Eckener’s
leadership). This second cycle of airships was the time of the famous
big zeppelins that are most commonly remembered (especially LZ-
127 »Graf Zeppelin« and LZ-129 »Hindenburg«) and which were the
first vehicles to provide intercontinental flight services. This short era
lasted only about 10 years, though: With the infamous crash of LZ-129
»Hindenburg« in Lakehurst, New Jersey in 1937 the era of airships
ended. Remaining airships were disassembled and the material used
for airplane production. In Friedrichshafen, one of the succeeding
firms of Luftschiffbau Zeppelin started to build airships again in the
1990s. Nevertheless, Airships remain a means of transportation from
the past and its modern successors (as the one that can be seen on the
Facebook-Screenshot above) have only little practical use – they serve
mostly advertising and sightseeing purposes.
2.3 literature bodies about and around zeppelins
As Zeppelin airships are a famous technology that is still fascinating
to many and known to everybody (at least in Germany), literature
about them is manifold. Surrounding coverage of the issue apart
from the technology itself or praise for its inventor deals with vari-
ous issues. As it is a technological artifact of iconic status, all kinds
of reports about it are numerous. While many of them are largely
redundant - the zeppelin history I have shortly summarized above is
part of most accounts along with many ever reprinted photographs
and other materials that are able to cater to the myth those books are
feeding on. If looking for reliable sources for scientific studies, only
such books that give sources and accomplish a certain degree of trans-
parency and accountability for the claims they make can be consid-
ered. Many of the books on zeppelins are primarily concerned with
depicting the artifact and its fascination respectively its creators and
care little about giving accurate accounts about it and many do not
give sources. Knäusel [30, 10] puts it nicely: He states trivial literature
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to be the by far biggest category of accounts about zeppelins, marked
by the redundancy of copied and rephrased repetitions of the same
narratives that are as shiny as they are desired and care less about the
accuracy than about telling the heroic story they intend to tell (and
sell, original quote: » [...] das Triviale überwiegt bei weitem. Die Triv-
ialität ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß durch ständiges Abschreiben
und Umformulieren ein mehr oder weniger aktuelles Zeppelin-Bild
destilliert wurde, das schön und glänzend ist; die Transparenz hat
allerdings eher gelitten, denn der Graf und seine Luftschiffe werden
so dargestellt, wie man sie haben möchte, nicht wie sie waren und
was sie waren.«). Among those, to give some examples out of many,
are Ege, Lundø, & Frello [13] and Griehl & Dressel [17]. This lack of
consistent quality, though is not too much of an obstacle for a decent
approach to the subject. There are numerous high quality accounts
- the existence of the mentioned popular literature parallel simply
means that a careful sampling of used literature has to be done in
order to receive results that represent reliable works suitable as ma-
terial for scientific work. Fortunately, the archives of Luftschiffbau
Zeppelin GmbH in Friedrichshafen maintain an own library. This li-
brary contains a vast number of books. Thus I could examine a great
number of publications and am confident to say I reached a satisfy-
ing level of both a high number of reliable accounts and an overview
over the existing literature enabling me to assume I did not miss ma-
jor publications.
As I am going to explain in the materials and methods section be-
low (chapter 5), those publications will form the basis of my analysis.
Building my empirical analysis on books, I want the reader to be fa-
miliar with the character of the works I use - the following passage is
hence intended to serve more as a point of reference for my analytical
part than itself giving too much information to the reader about the
events I am going to analyze. Those works are, as the popular works,
too, redundant in wide areas. Almost all of them, again, rely on Eck-
ener and his biography. Nevertheless, many add details to the bigger
picture: as most go into historic sources themselves, they differ a bit
in their findings and are therefore worthwhile considering. There-
fore, I bring up lots of sources that are each going to provide little
pieces to the mosaic I am going to create. I will give a brief overview
over existing material in the following sections. For the purpose of
this overview about the body of literature that is exploitable for sci-
entific endeavors, I’d like to introduce three categories: biographies,
airship history and writings dealing with aeronautics and airships in
particular from a social science perspective.
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2.3.1 Biographic Accounts
A first very important category is biographies, most of them about
Ferdinand Graf von Zeppelin. As the zeppelin technology has al-
ways been associated closely with its inventor and its development
depended a lot on Zeppelin’s personal finesse, those accounts give
important insights. The by far most important source in this cate-
gory that has already been cited abundantly in this piece of writing
is the biography »Graf Zeppelin – Sein Leben nach eigenen Aufzeichnun-
gen und persönlichen Erinnerungen« by Hugo Eckener [11] that I used
for the short introduction above. As mentioned above, it contains
very detailed accounts of Zeppelin’s life and background as well as
a comprehensive chronology on the zeppelin technology. Eckeners
close personal relation to Zeppelin and his involvement in the zep-
pelin companies make his accounts extremely valuable. Nearly all
accounts on Zeppelin are based on this book in one way or another.
Hans Rosenkranz’s book »Graf Zeppelin - Die Geschichte eines abenteuer-
lichen Lebens« [43], a second big monograph on Zeppelin’s person in
turn offers relatively little. At times he is coming up with new in-
formation, which rather raises doubt than curiosity as it often draws
different pictures than other authors - especially Eckener. Consider-
ing it was released during the short period of airship glory in the
Weimar Republic - and seven years before Eckener’s work on the sub-
ject - it has to be considered as a glorifying narrative of Zeppelin as
a popular hero that has been outdated by Eckener’s book. The de-
tails Rosenkranz brings up simply seem to be unreliable, especially
in direct comparison to Eckener. Therefore, I rely on Eckener’s book.
Despite some of the authors I cite use it, my personal judgement
led me to mistrust it and therefore not paying further attention to it.
Two more recent pieces close the circle: Clausberg [6] and Italiaander
[25] both dedicated monographs to the life of Zeppelin. Both have a
similar structure – instead of one continuous narrative like Eckener’s
work, they both divide their books into different chapters. This struc-
ture allows for a more comprehensive and detailed approach to differ-
ent aspects of Zeppelin’s life easier. Additionally, there is a multitude
of small pieces on Count Zeppelin. Many of those are relatively recent
and of high quality regarding their accomplishments in discovering
and analyzing new material or obtaining untouched sources. Typi-
cally these papers focus on individual aspects of Zeppelin’s life - e.g.
by Barbara Waibel [49], head researcher at the Zeppelin Archives, on
Zeppelin’s desperation after his discharge and the motivation this fact
brought along that was cited above. Several of those shorter pieces are
collected in an anthology on the occasion of an exhibition for the cen-
tenary of LZ-1’s maiden flightMeighörner and Zeppelin-Museum [35].
While all of these accounts largely rely on Eckener’s work, they still
end up with more balanced narratives than Eckener’s very positive
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depiction. The temporal distance as well as additional sources leads
to a broader and deeper analysis than Eckener’s at times affected
description. Moreover, those recent works focus equally on smaller
aspects of Zeppelin’s life. This way, they shed light on various sides
of Zeppelin’s personality and life and accomplish more differentiated
and detailed analysis on single issues than Eckener’s narrative thus
serving as a valuable enhancement of the existing literature.
Further information can be drawn from two biographies on Hugo
Eckener. Having become famous himself especially as the zeppelin’s
savior during the Weimar Republic (and especially after the Versailles
Treaty), his life story is capable of giving some insights. The work
of Nielsen [39] is less informative. Yet Eckener’s autobiography »Im
Zeppelin über Länder und Meere« [12] gives some accounts from his
memory that prove equally valuable as those given in his biography
on Zeppelin. The last piece I want to mention here are the memories
»Luftschiff voraus! Arbeit und Erleben am Werke Zeppelins« by Alfred
Colsmann [8]: As CEO of Zeppelin’s company, he was an important
advisor and companion to Zeppelin. In particular his insights into the
politics and managerial decisions of the early airship era Colsmann
gives insights that Eckener’s accounts lack.
2.3.2 Airship History
Of course, there are numerous works about the technological artifacts
itself - I limit my overview to those I found valuable to look into for
my endeavor as an exhaustive list would probably be both impossible
to create and irrelevant to the reader. A very comprehensive history
of the Zeppelin airships is given by Christopher Chant [5]. It draws
a quite complete picture from the very beginnings including Zep-
pelin’s personal background. Apart from being informative it offers
one other major advantage: It is written in English and offers a na-
tive speaker’s version of many special terms that appear and makes
writing about zeppelins in English a lot easier. Meighörner & Klein-
heins [28] offer a history of the zeppelin that is only partially valuable
for my analysis. While Meighörner & Kleinheins are very technical
and therefore of not much use here, Meyer [37] reconstructs early
ascents in detail in is therefore partially useful. However, as those
ascents themselves are of interest only in grades of detail that are
available in other sources, too, it offers no unique information for my
project. An anthology published by the city of Friedrichshafen[47]
for the centennial of the ’miracle at Echterdingen’ depicts the en-
trepreneurial side of the Zeppelin story - especially regarding the
difficult beginnings. Likewise does Hans G. Knäusel in his book »Zep-
pelin - Die Geschichte der Zeppelin-Luftschiffe: Konstrukteure, Technik, Un-
ternehmen« [32] which ties the entrepreneurial, historic and technical
storylines together. In a different piece [30], the same author gives
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both a chronological depiction of the technological development and
the surrounding conditions. Yet he is more concerned about stating
events than interpreting the environment of the airship to a greater
extent. The history surrounding the technology and the biographical
information serves more as a sort of frame for the technological narra-
tive. After criticizing other redundant narratives, his original sources
bring up some issues that are not mentioned by many other authors
and thus provide some added material to the discourse. Two further
publications by Knäusel are informative: »LZ1 - Der erste Zeppelin«
[31] and »LZ1 - Die große Verheißung«[29]. Both books are identical in
large parts. They provide a very nice account of the very beginnings
of Zeppelin’s interest in airships and the efforts it took him to build
his first prototype. Apart from the analysis Knäusel provides, the
books offer a quite unique feature: Knäusel publishes reproductions
of original documents from the time - speeches Zeppelin gave, letters
to and from him and various other documents that offer first-hand
insights into the difficult beginnings of Zeppelin’s airship venture.
2.3.3 Studies of the Zeppelin from a Social Science Perspective
While the former categories provide the frame of the entire story, for
an STS research project the social science literature about and around
count Zeppelin’s airship provides the most interesting pieces. Prob-
ably the most holistic approach comes from Guillaume de Syon [9].
He gives a great overview – basically re-telling the entire history of
Zeppelin airships from a fairly balanced perspective (not being Ger-
man might be helpful at this point - if understanding the zeppelin
as a technology with a national connotation, sharing the national
cultural background in which it is remembered with such affection
might prove to be a liability if one is not careful) and connecting the
history of the technology with surrounding phenomena. He pays
special attention to the relation of ’Germany’ to the technology – his
book is subtitled »Germany and the Airship 1900-1939«. As his ap-
proach to cover the entire span of existence of the airship gives not too
much room to the early developments, it still gives a very informative
overview. In his book »Deutschland hebt ab«, Helmut Reinicke [42] lights
the craze around the zeppelin airship from various perspectives. The
perspectives he chooses cover various angles – focusing on different
meanings the airship incorporated. Some important ones of those are
the airship as an example for the general fascination for technology,
the »national donation« (»Volksspende«) as a »cultic sacrifice« (origi-
nal quote: »Opferfest des deutschen Volkes«, [42, 25]), the airship as
symbol of upper class comforts in contrast to socialist tendencies and
the airship as imagined supreme weapon. Giving a great amount of
historic sources and material, a generally dramatic and elevated style
of writing sometimes gives the impression of Reinicke himself being
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sucked into the craze (original quote: »Zeppelinkult«, [42]) he writes
about. Nevertheless, his book is very rich on historic material and dis-
covers very many meanings of the technology that contribute to my
pursuit. Similar to Reinicke’s different perspectives, Rüdiger Haude
[18] introduces an even clearer categorization in his book »Grenzflüge
– Politische Symbolik der Luftfahrt vor dem ersten Weltkrieg: das Beispiel
Aachen«. He focuses his analysis on a particular region (the city of
Aachen) and analyzes different symbolisms of aviation and aeronau-
tics in general. His study focuses on the impact of aviation on this
city before World War I. The book complements Reinicke’s rich ac-
counts in a helpful way, giving a much clearer framework and back-
ground information about the society all these accounts took place
in. While it is not limited to airships, those do play a major role
in his book. The categories Haude uses to analyze reflect different
interpretations about the technology in society at this time. These
include the airships role in international understanding vs. military
supremacy, struggles between humankind and nation, the Rhine re-
gion and Prussia, middle class and aristocracy, political left and right,
individual and collective, sports and war, central authority in con-
trast to self organization as well as technology and nature. [18, 7].
With »A Nation of Fliers«, Peter Fritzsche [16] wrote another piece on
the fascination of Germans for flight in general and airships in par-
ticular. His perspective is not all too new - he mostly re-tells the
entire story of how Germans got all excited about the airship for an
English-speaking audience. Nevertheless, Fritzsche, too, contributes
by finding individual pieces of evidence on certain details that oth-
ers before him have missed or left out. And similarly to Chant’s
piece mentioned above, the English language is helpful in order to
write about the specific technology and its time. Frank [15] focuses
on the media’s role in the Zeppelin movement. While she explains
very nicely how the aesthetics of the airship added to the fascination
of the public, she focuses on the role risk and catastrophe had in the
creating and maintaining the myth around the Zeppelin. Sadly, she
does not cover the role of Zeppelin himself and his use of the media
for his purposes. Instead, she focuses on the elements of the pub-
lic’s fascination through media, mainly photographs that are not of
much use for my research. Warneken [50] gives a broad overview on
the working class movement’s position to and opinion about airships.
Being an ethnographer with specialization on this movement, espe-
cially the work he does sampling newspapers and newspaper articles
from the time around the Echterdingen miracle is invaluable for my
study. Further sources of interesting insights are the scientific annu-
als published by the Zeppelin Museum in Friedrichshafen. Those are
anthologies of all kinds of research around Zeppelin and his airships
- some of the papers contained are more valuable to my project, some
are less. Among those are Henry Cord Meyer’s accounts on national-
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ism in the conception of the zeppelin [36] and Jeannine Zeising’s pieces
about journalistic exploitation of the Zeppelin airship [54, 53]. In her
dissertation that forms the basis for both publications, she unveils the
relation of Zeppelin and the press in a detailed analysis. This analy-
sis brings to light several of the motives I am going to mention. Her
broad analysis of the media gives great insight into the visions, hopes,
dreams and fears that were associated with this new technology. An-
other piece by Clausberg [7] analyzes the imagination of airships in
German science fiction literature in the early 1900s. This category
is the most important one for my research. While I, too, draw on
Eckener several times, those works listed in this section form great
starting points for my endeavor as they provide great observations.

3
RESEARCH QUEST ION
As the short account of events I have given in chapter 2 has shown,
zeppelins had eventually become a matter of very high interest both
in Germany and abroad. Airship types were framed as national tech-
nologies; the airship was seen as a technology able to change the
world‘s face and the subduing of air and mastering flight a universal
quest. This unanimous support for aeronautics and Zeppelin airships
in particular as a ’national interest’ was all but clear in the beginning
and evolved only after several years. Yet when it did, the interest
in zeppelins and their appreciation grew very fast. However, the
support was the result of various factors coming together. As men-
tioned in the summary, explanations for the fascination for airships
are rather unsatisfactory so far. Although the literature on zeppelins
is extensive, it has not been in the focus of academic analysis how the
technology managed to reach this degree of popularity. While some
authors do of course talk about that, it is a question that receives rela-
tively little attention. It mostly comes up as a side note in the context
of different issues – for example the analysis of press coverage by
Zeising [53], or the fascination for flight in general by Fritzsche [16],
Haude [18] and Reinicke [42]. Maybe the case seems too clear and
obvious to be taken under scrutiny, yet I believe a thorough analysis
is indicated. Some authors just note the Volksspende taking place as
if it were a normal occurrence that such an event is covered through
public donations. Kleinheins and Meighörner [28, 20 f.], for example,
just note that people donated money out of sympathy for Zeppelin
and a feeling of regret of having lost LZ-4 (original quote: »Ergrif-
fen vom Verlust des LZ4 und begeistert für den Nationalhelden Graf
Zeppelin spendeten [. . . ]«). Why a nation should be touched by the
loss of a technological prototype is not even questioned but taken
for granted. Clausberg [6, 57] goes even further; stating everything
Zeppelin had struggled to achieve for years just fell into his lap with-
out him having a hand in the matter after the crash at Echterdingen
(original quote: »Was Zeppelin noch wenige Jahre zuvor trotz aller
Bemühungen und dringender Appelle nicht zu erreichen vermocht
hatte, das wurde ihm jetzt ohne sein Zutun in den Schoß gelegt«).
This interpretation lets the donations for Zeppelin appear as a ran-
dom phenomenon. It disregards social influences and, even more,
contributes to the classical determinist cliché (a little more on that in
chapter 4) of a prescribed development – as if the intrinsic qualities
of the zeppelin made the donation to be expected. The interpretation
that Zeppelin airships were attracting so much attention just by being
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of an appealing exterior seems to be at least questionable. It can be
assumed by what material has been collected and published in other
publications that the popularity of zeppelins had reasons that were
more complex. Moreover, I allege that STS as a discipline can make
valuable contributions to this issue. Thus I want to go back right to
the beginning of the Zeppelin discourse and repeat the most basic
questions of them all:
»what was it that made zeppelin airship cause
the intense reactions it aroused?«
»how did the technology become a national
symbol?«
and
»how could its popularity develop so quickly
after many years of ignorance by the public?«
Those questions aim at a core ambition of STS – the explanation of
technology development and its connection to the social. Moreover,
my approach contains an understanding of the process as not being
an isolated one but an intrinsically socio-technical setup, an entangle-
ment of social and technological factors. Also, a structured analysis
that relies on theoretical concepts is missing so far. What is there
on the issues touched by the questions asked above makes claims
about the phenomenon (such as the two statements by Eckener and
Frank that I mentioned before) without a clear framework of analysis.
Consequently the results are, as for example in the case of Reinicke’s
book on the zeppelin craze [42], somewhat inconclusive. STS method-
ologies are well suited for this task. They offer a rich toolkit for the
exact purpose of analyzing the relation of technology and society.
Part II
ANALYS I S

4
THEORET ICAL FRAMEWORK
As Zeising [53, 196] states, the fact that the entire society, in a moment
of unity overcoming all differences of politics and social class, de-
cided upon the continuation of an innovation is unique in Germany’s
industrial history (original quote: »Die Zeppelin-Luftschifffahrt kon-
frontiert uns mit dem in der deutschen Industriegeschichte einmali-
gen Fall, daß die Bevölkerung über die Weiterführung einer Innova-
tionsleistung entschied. Nach dem Unglück von Echterdingen ver-
schmolzen Vertreter aller Stände zu einer „Glaubensgemeinschaft“
im Zeichen des Zeppelins.«), a particular STS approach comes to mind
right away; this statement seems to straightforwardly ask for a SCOT
approach. The general public deciding on the development of a pri-
vate innovation is obviously a soci(et)al influence on technology de-
velopment – so what discipline would be qualified to think about it
if not one that is concerned with relations of technology and society
like STS is?
4.1 sts-approaches and conceptions to be used
In the attempt to understand technology production, STS fellows
have elaborated several concepts. Among the most common today
is the social construction of technology (SCOT ). SCOT argues that tech-
nologies are developed not according to some grid or game plan,
but in a social process: different groups influence the development
according to their own interpretation of the value of a technology
and make progress and outcome of technological developments very
hard to foresee. In the first articulation of the SCOT research program
by Bijker and Pinch [40] they mention that in their opinion, existing
strands of research have shortcomings in explaining the development
of technologies. They particularly mention innovation studies, his-
tory of technology and sociology of technology [40, 404]. They criti-
cize the first to be oversimplifying developments while historians do
not even examine them due to the ’obvious’ success of the artifact.
While they do not reject sociology of technology right away they pro-
pose their own, clearer, SCOT program as an improvement. The two
central concepts of SCOT are interpretative flexibility and relevant social
groups. Summarized very briefly, SCOT argues that different social
groups that are relevant for it and its development regard every tech-
nology differently. Basically this is any group of individuals that is
relevant to a technology and its development. This begins with those
developing it, continues with anyone in contact with the technology
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and ends with those rejecting it. What the technology means to those
groups is flexible: while it may be entertaining for some, it may be
useful or even threatening to others. Most importantly, there is not
one meaning or place a particular technology or artifact takes in a so-
cial context. Much more, it has multiple meanings that are different
for different actors.
These two conceptions are particularly interesting for the zeppelin
case: the social structure of the German Reich at the time was quite
fragmented. Without any ambition to create an exhaustive list, one
could come up with several societal divides along which groups of
some sort could form. Just to mention a few there were groups of
social status (working class, bourgeoisie, nobles, ...) different sexes,
genders, confessions, regional distinctions (as we came across before
- remember the resentments of Prussia and southern Germany men-
tioned in chapter 2), and others more. The notion of relevant social
groups allow for different perspectives to be investigated on at the
same time. It acknowledges the diversity of a society and by allowing
for interpretative flexibility grants the right for everyone to develop
their own perception of the artifact. In order to approach the situation
as I do, this openness is a key feature to the theoretical framework.
Both conceptions are very open and exclude almost nobody or any-
thing from being influential: anything could happen. This built-in
contingency is very much aiming at the paradigms of technological
determinism, a school of thought Pinch and Bijker were struggling
with and to which they built SCOT as a counter argument. The con-
ception of interpretative flexibility is a simple as intuitive: technolo-
gies can be put to more than one use – what is seen in them depends
not only on themselves but also on individuals encountering them.
The consequences thereof are not limited to the use of an artifact –
all kinds of interactions with an artifact can be affected. An example
Pinch and Bijker give is
»not only that there is flexibility in how people think of,
or interpret, artefacts, but also that there is flexibility how
artefacts are designed. There is not just one possible way,
or one best way, of designing an artifact. [. . . ] It can be
shown that different social groups have radically different
interpretations of one technological artifact.« [40, 421 ff.]
This flexibility is what makes SCOT so valuable for studies like mine:
both interpretation and design to be flexible has meaningful conse-
quences for technology production. Assuming both sides of the pro-
cess are flexible implicates that they can interact – or even negotiate
about both the design and the interpretation of the technology.
This perception is already enough to defy a determinist develop-
ment: integrating the contingency of interaction, a linear develop-
ment can no longer be expected. However, »If one does not accept in-
terpretative flexibility, one is almost certain to fall prey to determinist
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thinking.« [2, 281] Technological determinism argues for technologies
to have essential features and qualities. These qualities, according to
technological determinism, decide upon their success and the impact
they have on social structure. As they are inherent in the artifact,
their impact and thus also their development is forseeable and walks
down a prescribed path. My approach, however, does not follow this
perception but of course assumes the technological and the social co-
evolve and form each other. As Sismondo [45, 101] puts it: »To accept
that technologies do not have essences is to pull the rug out from
under technological determinism.«
Further core conceptions of SCOT are the terms stabilization and clo-
sure. Those refer to the interaction/negotiation of meaning. Accord-
ing to SCOT, the interactions between relevant social groups lead to a
»emergence of consensus and stabilization« [40, 424]. Thereby, they
refer to the development on one predominant and shared perception
of a technology. Usually, SCOT says, »one artifact, that is, one mean-
ing as attributed by one social group - becoming dominant across
all relevant social groups.« [2, 271] Once this stabilization progresses,
the discourse about the technology will eventually experience closure
through consensus. Then finally there is onemeaning of a technology
that is widely shared. This does, however, not mean that only one per-
ception exists. Rather, it means one perception is predominant and
commonly agreed upon. Individuals or groups may still disagree.
Yet this consensus does not necessarily mean anything has actually
happened.
»Closure in technology involves the stabilization of an
artefact and the ’disappearance’ of problems. To close a
technological ’controversy’ the problems need not to be
solved in the common sense of that word. The key point
is whether the relevant social groups see the problem as
being solved. In technology, advertising can play an im-
portant role in shaping the meaning which a social groups
gives to an artefact.« [40, 427]
How closure is achieved differs: problems can ’disappear’ through
technological progress, they can be ’solved’ by changing surrounding
conditions or they can, as one might see later in this piece, find clo-
sure through a redefinition of what the actual problem was and what
it was that one was disagreeing about.
The summary given of count Zeppelin‘s endeavor to create rigid
airships gives a very nice example of such struggles and unforeseen
difficulties. Again and again, Zeppelin interacted with relevant so-
cial groups, in his case (at least early on) mostly the Prussian mili-
tary administration, about the interpretation of his technology – in
that case mainly about whether the technology was seen as having
enough potential to be worth fundingits further development. As has
been shown, Zeppelin also looked for support by various groups and
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progress in his project largely depended on scarce and hardly pre-
dictable events of support as the military remained hesitant. Yet the
reasons for this support and the eventual breakthrough of the technol-
ogy are not really explicable by a simple SCOT approach. The troubles
during the project are; its resolution is not: When the Volksspende
took place in 1908, the zeppelin LZ-4 had just experienced another
crash, which could very well have been interpreted as one more set-
back and confirmation for the deficits of the technology. At least
to perceive the zeppelin as a solution to an actual technological chal-
lenge of the time seems to have required a very optimistic perspective.
And simple aesthetics (as Eckener and Frank, mentioned above) seem
to be only a small part of the solution. One very crucial aspect SCOT
does not touch (and has that in common with much of the literature
on Zeppelin airships discussed above) are motivations for actors to
get involved in the process of technology creation the potential conse-
quences of technological development. However, as the huge wave of
support Zeppelin encountered in 1908 – a stage when his technology
was still immature would greatly benefit from that information. This
aspect is crucial to my endeavor of finding out how a firstly unreliable
and apparently dangerous technology was given not only the chance
to evolve despite its early setbacks but was additionally support so
broadly with substantial financial means.
4.2 sociotechnical imaginaries complement the scot-
toolkit
One opportunity to shed light into them is provided by a different
school of thought that is able to take the SCOT approach further than
where it originally went. In her recent work, Harvard scholar Sheila
Jasanoff has developed a concept she introduces as »sociotechnical
imaginaries« (STI) [27]. Those are, in her conception »collectively imag-
ined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and
fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects.«
[27, 120] The notion »imaginaries« already introduces an important
feature of this concept. Imaginaries open up time as a dimension of
analysis - while SCOT does not take into account the timely develop-
ment of technological development, using imaginaries introduces the
possibility to create a future that is distinct from the present through
technology. SCOT bases its concept on an ex-post perspective on deci-
sions about a technology. In their famous bicycle case, Pinch & Bijker
[40] show nicely how bikes as we know them have evolved over time
and how many of the innovations along the way have been left be-
hind again. However, those technologies left behind are described
not from the perspective of what their prospects might have been
but in terms of what these did or did not fit in the present time of
their introduction. The contingency of the relation between variation
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and actual necessities is a feature both approaches share. A dimen-
sion that SCOT does not touch, however, is the ex-ante perspective on
time and development: while ex post many things are explicable, the
ex ante perspective is much less closed and subject to great insecu-
rities - yet to opportunities that have later on been closed by time:
while commercial failure of an innovation is hard to negate, advertis-
ing a bright and shining future for a technological artifact before its
actual development is not limited. Likewise unrestricted is the place-
ment of hopes and expectations into a development that is uncertain.
Implicitly, of course, this is contained in SCOT, too: the inventor or
entrepreneur building an artifact or developing a technology does, of
course, think of the future. If he gets lucky, his expectations may even
be fulfilled. Thus, a selection takes place before actual development.
By dedicating time and funds to a project, someone manifests his or
her vision of a technology. The concept of sociotechnical imaginaries
opens this stage for a broader audience. The imagination about pos-
sible futures does not only concern single individuals but can take
entire groups or even societies into consideration. Actually it was cre-
ated explicitely for the purpose of looking at national conceptions of
technology. In that way, sociotechnical imaginaries can very well seen
as a version of technology interpretation that is not oriented toward
the past and present but towards the future.
One tangible example is the space race of the 1960s: upon John F.
Kennedy‘s vision of exploring space, an entire society developed a
common goal of sending a man safely to the moon. The most crucial
aspect here is clear: expectations change present action. They have
the potential to change behavior from a reactive to a proactive atti-
tude. An expectation enables subjects to adapt to potential and/or
probable futures. They can take an optimized position in the present
to be better off in the future. Yet this privilege is not unlikely to be-
come a mandatory reaction. Not only does it offer the chance but
demands a reaction - once an individual is alert about the impact it
has upon its own future, an attitude of actively seeking to shape it is
likely to evolve.
Furthermore, the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries circles around
national conceptions of technology and how technologies collabo-
rate in the creation of national identities. The collective imagination
quoted above refers mainly to policy-makers. The research program
Jasanoff proposes and partly executes in her 2009 paper [27] is fo-
cused on science & technology policies. She explains »S&T policies
thus provide unique sites for exploring the role of political culture
and practices in stabilizing particular imaginaries, as well as the re-
sources that must be mobilized to represent technological trajectories
as being in the ’national interest.’« [27, 121] In that sense, the ap-
proach she uses is a top-down perspective. The state plays a huge
role defining what is the public good, who should be served by S&T
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policies, who should decide about S&T policies and how controver-
sies in the field are to be ended.
Moreover, a comprehensive summary of Jasanoff’s ambitions is for-
mulated by her as follows: »How do national S&T projects encode
and reinforce particular conceptions of what a nation stands for?«
[27, 120] The power of technology upon social structure is not limited
to actual technology. As with any other unifying momentum such as
belief or political view, the imaginary forming groups is not bound to
existing things. Likewise, utopias and ideal imaginations can serve
as a unifying momentum. Jasanoff mentions this explicitly and refers
to this fact in her introduction of sociotechnical imaginaries:
»The concept of sociotechnical imaginaries builds in part
on the growing recognition that the capacity to imagine
futures is a crucial constitutive element in social and po-
litical life. Imagination is no longer seen as mere fantasy
or illusion (Sarewitz 1996), but as an important cultural
resource that enables new forms of life by projecting pos-
itive goals and seeking to attain them. [...] imagination
helps produce systems of meaning that enable collective
interpretations of social reality (Castoriadis 1987); it forms
the basis for a shared sense of belonging and attachment
to a political community (Anderson 1991); [...] In short,
imagination, viewed as ‘‘an organized field of social prac-
tices,’’ serves as a key ingredient in making social order
(Appadurai 1996; Taylor 2004).« [27, 122]
On a smaller scale, this social order can refer to ’groups’ in a clas-
sical sense: Interest groups, lobbies or many others. On a greater
scale, however, this concept is applicable to entire societies: »collec-
tively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the
design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technolog-
ical projects.« [27, 120] not only are able to reflect a national society,
but are able to create a national identity from a society that is not so
united. I intend to show in this case study how this worked through
the collective imagination that zeppelins would deeply transform so-
ciety and change it for the better or the worse. This ties nicely to
the very beginning of this chapter: the quote of Zeising mentioning
the role the Zeppelin airships played in the forming of German na-
tional identity. (original quote: »Nach dem Unglück von Echterdin-
gen verschmolzen Vertreter aller Stände zu einer „Glaubensgemein-
schaft“ im Zeichen des Zeppelins.« [53, 196]) It is to be revealed how
those points tie together in the analysis. Yet they give a very inter-
esting prospect. In fact, it promises both crucial concepts, SCOT as
well as STI to be able to showcase their particularities: While SCOT
promises to integrate the diversity of the German society around 1900
and the its many inherent conflicts, STI brings a different assett: While
SCOT perceives closure as meaning that »typically a closure process
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results in one social group’s meaning becoming dominant« [2], the
concept of STI allows for a new interpretation. Assuming a new imag-
inary »encode[s] and reinforce[s] particular conceptions of what a
nation stands for?« [27, 120], it might just as well be that a new mean-
ing emerges out of the discourse that then redefines the constitution
of relevant social groups. Going with the United States’ motto ’e
pluribus unum - out of many, one’, the zeppelin could in this way be
depicted as an important factor for the unification of a fragmented
society.
4.3 tying together sociotechnical imaginaries and scot
As the zeppelin case will show, the pursuit of a vision, the develop-
ment of a technology not as a reaction to current challenges but as an
effort to push boundaries can be a driving force. The development of
a shared vision can thus open up entirely new technological spaces
(in opposition to gradual development over a large timespan) and
secondly the shared vision can itself, as quoted from Jasanoff above
»encode and reinforce particular conceptions of what a nation stands
for« by providing a piece of shared identity. It is not limited to apply-
ing an existing technology to present challenges, but it enables one to
open up entirely new fields – scenarios that are yet only imaginable
and seem unrealistic.
Imaginaries and their orientation towards the future bring along
some very substantial aspects that greatly enhance the interpretative
flexibility of an artifact. First of all, the point of time at which the
imagined is to become reality can remain indefinite. In other words,
the imaginary has at (almost) no point to be declared as failed - the
vision can rather be adjusted to changing surrounding conditions and
prerequisites. Just as well, time can simply remain opaque: a refer-
ence to the future - whatever that means - can be enough to create an
expectation or make others start imagining themselves. Second, not
only can the vision be adapted. The imagined future can be made
more likely to actually unfold by own actions. These prospects and
actions, however, change the present - and the actor itself as well as
his or her behavior. This active pursuit of one’s future allows for an
actor or a group of them to change and adapt in order to make one
particular vision of the future more likely. Moreover, the futuristic
character of the imaginary frees the vision from the restriction to rely
on existing and/or realistic technologies. As it is about what is go-
ing to be, not what is, the range of what can be envisioned increases
dramatically. Technological development has not to be thought in
consecutive steps but can be seen from the end - which might ease
engagement into a long process in contrast to seeing the process from
the beginning. Thus those imaginaries can be ahead of their time and
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encourage others to think outside the box of what is feasible at the
moment. A very nice example for this is how Zeppelin propagates
the potential his technology has for mail services. In 1895 [57], 5
years before the maiden flight of his first prototype and more than
10 years before his technology became actually successful, Zeppelin
was already capable of giving a vivid description of what would be
possible. Without even the smallest hint on when, if at all, this is
actually going to be the case he gave the audience detailed informa-
tion about mail delivery times to New York (5 1/4 days), Bombay
(6 days) and several others. He even announced heavy freight to
bring along no further complications. (original quote: »Größte Bedeu-
tung werden die Fahrzeuge jedenfalls im Weltpostverkehr erlangen.
Die Post ließe sich von Berlin aus nach Konstantinopel in 38, nach
Alexandrien in 60 Stunden, nach New York in 5 1/4, nach Bombay
in 6 Tagen, je in einem Fluge befördern. Dabei dürften die Postsäcke
mehrere hundert Kilogramm schwer sein, und bedeutende Lasten
könnten in Schleppfahrzeugen, ohne erhebliche Fahrtverlangsamung,
verfrachtet werden.« [57]). There was, of course, no point of know-
ing for him whether any of that was even realistic at that time - all
calculations about speed that existed at the time were rough estima-
tions, nothing more. And as we know today, an airship mail network
never existed (except for a brief period of time in the 1920s when
Zeppelin airships LZ-127 and LZ-129 delivered mail on their transat-
lantic flights, though it was single routes, no network). Zeppelin was
wise enough not to promise anything to happen at a certain point in
time. Yet in the end (years later) he said enough for his compatriots
to follow their imaginations and support him.
That way, Jasanoff‘s concept introduces a new temporal dimension
SCOT left behind. It opens up interpretative flexibility to more dreams,
visions and utopias. In addition to this opening of discourses about
technologies, there are very complementary if not even unifying el-
ements to the two approaches. Specifically, with her concept of so-
ciotechnical imaginaries, Jasanoff ties into the (never asked) question
what makes a relevant social group a relevant social group. Pinch
and Bijker introduce the concept of relevant social groups as if it was
self-evident that social groups are existent and exercise influence on
all sorts of developments. So why should there be any exception from
that? The argument appears somewhat self-evident to the reader, too,
and it is not for nothing that SCOT was received so well and the con-
ception of relevant social groups has been accepted. However intu-
itively right and comprehensive through anyone‘s own experiences,
an explanation why those groups form and what constitutes them as
groups is missing. Jasanoff now provides one possible explanation
of what these groups can actually be: communities sharing similar
perceptions of what and how future should be. All groups have a
unifying momentum: a belief, language, culture or else. However
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defined in detail, by all means they share something. The founding
fathers of SCOT, Pinch and Bijker acknowledge this:
»The key requirement is that all members of a certain so-
cial group share the same set of meanings, attached to a
specific artefact. In deciding which social groups are rel-
evant, the first question is whether the artefact has any
meaning at all for the members of the social group under
investigation.« [40, 414]
Later, Bijker continues to stress the influence not only by the groups
and their shared influence on the invention process itself, but by a
much more subtle influence. Since inventors are themselves social-
ized human beings, their origin and socializations may manifest itself
in the technological artifacts they build all by themselves.
»The characteristics of these individuals, however, are also
a product of social shaping. Values, skills, and goals are
formed in local cultures, and we can therefore understand
technological creativity by linking it to historical and soci-
ological stories« [2, 4]
However, this perspective is a one way street. It is all about preex-
isting social groups showing interest in an artifact. Just as well, the
relevance can be expressed by a lack of interest. The fate of unsuc-
cessful innovations is often not decided by interested groups but by
targeted social groups not finding »any meaning at all« [see above]
for an artifact. In the case of Zeppelin airships, history would not
have become so complicated if those targeted with the artifact had
accepted it from the beginning. As mentioned, the Prussian military
administration did not acknowledge or even recognize the potential
of count Zeppelin‘s invention. It was simply too fantastic. The sec-
ond, more crucial critique I want to raise is the point that existing
social groups are said to be interested (or not) in an artifact. This
clearly implies a solely unidirectional influence of the social onto the
technical: existing social structure influences the fate of technological
development. It could, however, be much different. The relevant so-
cial group could just as well form around a shared interpretation of
an artifact. This interpretation (or imaginary) can just as well serve as
constituting element of a social group that evolves due to its position-
ing towards an emerging technology. It has to be stated that at least
a potential of the technical development to influence social structure
has to be acknowledged. It would be naive to state otherwise, as brief
thought allows coming up with many examples of technologies hav-
ing had heavy influence on the development of social structure. And
even though SCOT is called social construction of technology, not tech-
nological construction of the social, the possibility of the game being
played the other way round should at least be mentioned. Other the-
ories have managed this point with a less unidirectional conception.
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Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), for example, describes the interaction
of technology and social as »heterogeneous networks that bring to-
gether actants of all types and sizes, whether human or nonhuman.«
[1, 206]
In my empirical analysis, I am going to showcase such groups. Ac-
cordingls imaginaries do not only admit to a future user possibly
finding the technology useful in a way - whether as intended by the
inventor or not (called interpretative flexibility by Pinch and Bijker) -
but allow for a concept of societies making efforts to come to terms
with a vision. Thus, they manifest the side of the coin SCOT avoids:
the technical construction of the social. Not for nothing is it called
social construction of technology - the unidirectional focus is clear in its
original conception. However, Bijker is aware of this flaw. Therefore,
he opens SCOT up in a publication from 2010[3]. He expands SCOT,
admitting that social actors react to technologies and thus those are
not without influence on society:
»The central concept here is ‘technological frame’. A tech-
nological frame structures the interactions among the mem-
bers of a relevant social group, and shapes their think-
ing and acting. It is similar to Kuhn’s (1970) concept
‘paradigm’ with one important difference: ‘technological
frame’ is a concept to be applied to all kinds of relevant
social groups [. . . ] A technological frame is built up when
interaction ‘around’ an artefact begins. In this way, ex-
isting practice does guide future practice though without
logical determination. A technological frame describes the
actions and interactions of actors, explaining how they so-
cially construct a technology. But since a technological
frame is built up around an artefact and thus incorporates
the characteristics of that technology, it also explains the
influence of the technical on the social.« [3, 69]
This is where and how Bijker’s method is to overcome its flaw of
being a one-way concept of the social influencing technological de-
velopment. By introducing the ’technological frame’, he creates an
arena in which both the social and the technical can influence each
other. Once this is established, he soon bridges the limitations of the
frame by introducing the outcome of a stabilized frame: A sociotech-
nical ensemble of both technological and social actors. Many of those
ensembles then form the entirety of sociotechnical reciprocity: tech-
nological culture. Reciprocal influence of society and technology is a
well-known concept in STS. It does not take Bijker long for a transi-
tion:
»“Co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the
ways in which we know and represent the world (both na-
ture and society) are inseparable from the ways in which
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we choose to live in it. Knowledge and its material em-
bodiment are at once products of social work and consti-
tutive of forms of social life.“ (Jasanoff, 2004, p. 2) The
idea is to explain the developments of society and technol-
ogy as two sides of the same coin. This borders on thick
description and answering ‘how’ questions, rather than
answering ‘why’ questions with clearly explicated causal
chains.« [3, 69]
Yet while these concessions open SCOT in terms of conceptually inte-
grating technology’s influence in society, the temporal dimensions re-
main very implicit. Hence Jasanoff’s concept of imaginaries remains
very relevant to my work in order to integrate the anticipatory aspects
imaginaries raise and their consequences as well as power. Ulrike
Felt adds to the explication of an aspect of sociotechnical imaginar-
ies that is very crucial and was not mentioned by Jasanoff before. In
her recent contribution »Keeping Technologies Out: Absent presences and
the formation of national technopolitical identity« [14], she is particularly
concerned with the question how sociotechnical imaginaries build up
over time. This aspect is very helpful answering the ’how’-question
just referred to by Bijker. It enables us to see and take notice of
changes imaginaries undergo over time. In her conceptualization of
how discourses about sociotechnical imaginaries stabilize, Felt speaks
of »memory practices« [14, 11]. She describes the discourse as a series
of rehearsals in which different perceptions of a technology are ’tried
out’. Each ’performance’ is then evaluated and remembered during
following discourse rehearsals. This way, the rehearsals lead up to a
finished play, a studied performance that has proven reliable and can
be stuck to over time. Those construction processes are called assem-
blages in her approach: Out of several interpretations and pieces of
imaginaries, a stabilized ’assemblage’ is formed. Also, the experience
from a discourse emerging in a specific socio-technical setting can eas-
ily, as is demonstrateD, influence and/or support another. This way,
technological cultures can form over time and evolve through the ex-
periences they make during this process. This piece is particularly
important as we will see that the imaginaries carrying the Zeppelin
phenomenon were themselves „standing on the shoulders of giants“
if one wants to alienate the expression; important discourses prior
and parallel to the development of Zeppelin’s airship played a big
role. Proceeding with the efforts of relating sociotechnical imaginar-
ies to SCOT, assemblages might be presentable as an alternative notion
for the actual process of stabilization and thus in its details provide a
further level of analysis SCOT does not dive in too deeply.
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4.4 a side note : the heterogeneous engineer
The theoretical conception I choose in combination with the case I ap-
ply it to brings along an implicit assumption. As was to be seen in the
narrative told in chapter 2, Zeppelin was very active in advertising,
placing and talking about his invention. The success of his technol-
ogy is therefore his success as a promoter for it. Acknowledging the
dependence of technological development from social proceedings of
course means that individuals can have an influence on it. As has
already been said in chapter 2, and will become even more apparent
in the analysis, the zeppelin venture depended greatly on Zeppelin’s
talent and finesse. Not only his engineering skills, but his talents as
a salesman, media manager and other things were important to the
development. STS coined a term for this phenomenon: The so-called
heterogeneous engineer, developbed by Hughes (e.g. [4]) and oth-
ers, is a concept that was developed to include all those capabilites
needed into an assembled package to describe an engineer as more
than just the ’brains’ of technological innovations but also their initial
motor. Moreover, it formulates (again quite contrary to technological
deteminism) that the greatest idea is nothing without a proper de-
velopment beyond the mere technological construction. Law nicely
summarizes:
»The argument is that those who build artifacts do not
concern themselves with artifacts alone but must also con-
sider the way in which the artifacts relate to social, eco-
nomic, political and scientific factors. All these factors are
interrelated, and all are potentially malleable. The argu-
ment, in other words, is that innovators are best seen as
system builders.« [34, 112]
While this is conception is no big addition or challenge to the theo-
retical framework, I propose for the reader to keep it in mind. The
fields of Zeppelins activities, as the analysis is about to show, were
manifold. Having in mind that innovation work consists of more than
just inventing and constructing artifacts may be rewarding to better
understand the industrious activities of Zeppelin.
4.5 goals and scope of the project
As mentioned above, I want to try to answer my research questions
under as special consideration of the SCOT-approach. Nevertheless,
some newer conceptions are very promising for my endeavor. Par-
ticularly, including Jasanoff’s concept of sociotechnical imaginaries
and thereby a perspective on futures into the frame of analysis brings
up an entirely new topic: an orientation towards the upcoming, the
possible. As shown above, this perspective of imaginations and what
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they can bring along has been widely ignored so far although it might
be a key aspect to understand people’s engagement and support for
the new technology. Nevertheless, and I am going to show this in
the writing, the imagination of futures was opened up by Count Zep-
pelin. His different conceptualizations of his technology and its uses
enabled not just a limited, but very diverse public to get attached to
the airship. He himself opened the discourse around the purpose
of his invention thus allowing for more different groups to imagine
different futures with his machines. This fits nicely to another theo-
retical conception mentioned: the consideration of how those imagi-
naries are assembled by Felt tie into the development of those foun-
dations of SCOT. They show that interpretations of technology are not
just there or given, but develop and change over time. This process of
development does, of course, underlie influences and can thus be con-
trolled or it can at least be attempted to gain control over it. Therefore,
Jasanoff’s concept is going to be one keystone to my work. However,
I use her concept a bit different from her original intention: Jasanoff
aims at illuminating how science and technology policies can lead
to a redefinition of conceptualizations on nationhood and its docu-
mentation. The case of Zeppelin airships can show how different
imaginations of a technology can be united in common points and
how this unity can be used to build a shared concept of a nation
in the first place. Thereby, S&T policies are made themselves. This
conceptualization of a case has three, maybe four goals:
1. First of all to enrich the number of cases with one of a different
kind: Many STS cases present deal with recent technological de-
velopments. The study at hand would provide another historic
example to show that it is suitable for the same analysis.
2. Secondly, it aims at enriching the research around zeppelins by
a new perspective. While much has been written about it, it
is still hardly reflected what fascinated people about it - the
proposed application of imagined futures will contribute to un-
derstanding the social dynamics in a better way and enrich the
existing literature by a further perspective.
3. Thirdly, it adds to the relatively new concept of STI: while de-
veloped as a top-down perspective, the case at hand shows that
these imaginaries can also work bottom-up and be a useful re-
source to bring order into unordered discourse. Top down is
meant here as an interpretation that Jasanoff does not mean pri-
marily that STIs are developed through discourse in the entire
socitey. Instead, the STIs are meant to be developed for socitey
and then spread in it. Much like the re-interpretation of ’French-
ness’ in the French nuclear enerrgy discourse[20], the discourse
happens in rather small groups for society, not by society. The for-
mation of groups (or even nations, see above) through shared
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perceptions of technologies would form the mentioned opposite
case. In that example the STI would be the meeting point for in-
dividuals - thus social structure would be emerging out of the
discourse and the STI. It depicts in a very nice way how not only
the technological is shaped by the social, but how technological
artifacts can shape the social world. This touches grounds the
original SCOT avoids: the technical construction of the social.
Bijker has already reacted to the lack of this aspect: »After suc-
cessfully criticizing technological determinism and again ask-
ing the question— though in different terms—of the impact of
technology on society, the development of social institutions as
constituted by technology also came to the agenda.« [3, 71] In
this 2010 piece, he opens SCOT by introducing »sociotechnical
ensembles« [3, 66] of social and technical matters that recipro-
cally influence each other instead of only the social imprinting
on technology. The zeppelin case might be able to provide a
very nice example for this new conception of SCOT.
5
METHODOLOGY AND MATER IALS
In order to achieve the goals I have set for the theoretical aspect of
my thesis, a sound methodological approach is a central requirement
to be met. Also, as I claimed an approach using a clear theoretical
framework and a structured analysis to be missing in the discourse
about the zeppelin’s popularity. Hence the methodological approach
is of course an important one for my study to achieve its goals of
providing exactly that and thereby cotributing something previously
lacking.
5.1 methodology
The methodology for my study comes with the SCOT approach. It
is already introduced in the origins of SCOT from 1984 [40]. Bijker
provides a clearer account of the methodological approach to a SCOT
study in his piece »How is technology made? -That is the question!« from
2010 [3]. He describes a three-step process consisting of:
Step 1: analysis of the artifact to regarding its interpre-
tative flexibility and relevant social groups active in its
construction
Step 2: a description of the process of social construction
of the artifact
Step 3: an explanation how and why this construction
process worked with regards to technological frames of
relevant social groups
I would like to mostly stick with these steps. Giving more detailed
instructions, the methodology is described as followed:
»Key concepts in the first step are ‘relevant social group’
and ‘interpretative flexibility’. [. . . ] relevant social groups
can be identified by looking for actors who mention the
artefact in the same way. [. . . ] Because the description
of an artefact through the eyes of different relevant social
groups produces different descriptions—and thus differ-
ent artefacts—this results in the researcher’s demonstrat-
ing the ‘interpretative flexibility’ of the artefact.« [3, 68]
This step Bijker describes is somewhat redundant, at least for I am
going to do. As my interest lies in the STI connected to the zeppelin,
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it would be an unnecessary detour, if not even a mistake, to proceed
as Bijker proposes: to look for statements made about the artifact to
trace them back to their origins and then looking at how the individ-
uals coining them perceive the artifact seems redundant when this
positioning towards the artifact becomes apparent in the statments
that were at hand in the first place. Approaching the subject with STI
in mind and thereby implying that the relevant social groups can just
as well be formed around the STI then the other way around, this step
seems like an unnecessary complication.
As my interest is the formation (or assemblage, as Felt might call it
[14]) of the stable zeppelin imaginary which became widely shared,
I am not going to dig all too deep into Bijker’s concept of relevant
social groups. I believe my research topic allows addressing this con-
ception through a detour that fits my approach better. As I want to
have a look at the imaginaries and the way they formed, not the peo-
ple having them are the most relevant part but an imagination they
share.
Moreover, social groups interested in the airship are not easily sep-
arated. As to be seen in the categories Haude [18] introduces (see
chapter 2.3.3), the social divides separating those are not necessarily
consistent with each other or mutually exclusive. This makes a suffi-
ciently consistent classification of relevant social groups difficult if not
impossible. Additionally a thorough analysis of multiple groups in
the level of detail demanded here would go beyond the scope of this
study and most likely end with a narrative confusing to the reader
and in big parts irrelevant to my project. Readers interested in such a
detailed examination of the German society of the early 20th century
might find the level of detail they are looking for in Haude’s [18] or
Reinicke’s [42] books when looking for material directly related to the
social order and aeronautics. A more general yet comprehensive and
detailed description of the development of the German Reich and its
society between 1866 and 1918 is given by Stürmer [48].
Therefore, I propose a different approach to the entities of my anal-
ysis. Such a shared imagination can be considered as constituting
element of a group. Thus it is possible to stick to positions towards
and visions concerning the dirigible published. This approach, while
turning the process around, is able to come to the same results as the
one Bijker proposed – it just turns around the order in which steps
are taken. Instead of approaching the relevant social groups first and
then having a look on their imaginations of the technology, I am go-
ing to look at STI directly. In a second step and as a side note, I will
look at who it was that had this interpretation in mind.
Some examples about the typical background of people sharing
a certain imagination will for sure be helpful to illustrate what is
talked about. And as my materials are mostly secondary sources,
such descriptions will be provided along in general lines. The piece
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by Warneken (1984), for example, that I am going to use to draw on
skeptic voices on the zeppelin is explicitly focused on the working
class movement – hence does provide such basic information about
the social groups behind it.
This approach is a both feasible and allowable adaption to Bijker’s
methodological step. As it is going to lead to largely the same re-
sults, it is even preferable to the exact approach by Bijker. It is going
to be more focussed on the character of STI and its functioning and
thereby provide my analysis with a lean and focused approach to
what matters most about my research. In order to demonstrate the
interpretative flexibility of the zeppelin, I am going to introduce two
exemplary in-depth interpretations of examples for it. Those are go-
ing to introduce different perspectives on the airships and illustrate
them sufficiently to then go on to proceed with the second step of the
analysis.
»In the second step, the researcher follows how the in-
terpretative flexibility diminishes, because some artefacts
gain dominance over the others and meanings converge
[. . . ] Here, key concepts are ‘closure’ and ‘stabilisation’.
Both concepts are meant to describe the result of the pro-
cess of social construction. ‘Stabilisation’ stresses the pro-
cess character: a process of social construction can take
several years in which the degree of stabilisation slowly in-
creases up to the moment of closure. ‘Closure’ [. . . ] high-
lights the irreversible end point of a discordant process in
which several artefacts existed next to each other.« [3, 69]
This second step is going to center on the events at Echterdingen
and the time around it: after all, it seems to have been that it was the
crash of LZ-4 that led to the stabilization and closure upon Germany’s
airship fascination. However, years of work before that event did
not accomplish what did then happen. This long timespan of non-
initiation of stabilization and closure is going to be examined, too.
It is especially relevant because it put pressure on Zeppelin and by
the times changing also changed the environmental conditions of the
technological development. It will be examined how the imaginations
towards the airship and its potential changed in the relatively short
timespan in summer of 1908 when the zeppelin craze broke loose.
Particularly interesting is going to be how a public that did not really
support the technology before came to do so after an event that was
actually a failure – the zeppelin, in the end, did not pass the 24-hour
endurance trial – and how interpretative flexibility and STI supported
the process. The latter, then, will be the focus of the third step of my
analysis.
»In the third step, the processes of stabilisation that have
been described in the second step are analysed and ex-
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plained by interpreting them in a broader theoretical frame-
work: why does a social construction process follow this
way, rather than that?« [3, 69]
This is the decisive step of my analysis as it is exactly concerned
with the question I framed as my research question. My working
hypothesis is that Zeppelin’s opening of the technology to interpreta-
tive flexibility enabled this stabilization and final closure. The irony
of opening leading to closure is remarkable. I am going to argue that
the openness Zeppelin proposed for his technology was cleverly in-
troduced in a way that it would not get in his way of realizing his
own conceptualization of what his invention was good for. This way,
the zeppelin could be more than just the technological system it was
promoted as in the beginning.
5.2 materials
Materials with which to work on my subject are abundant. Like many
researchers before, I am rather facing the problem of having too much
at hand than having too little to work on: A first very important
source for my work is the archive of Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH in
Friedrichshafen. As part of Count Zeppelin’s heritage, the Zeppelin
foundation operates a museum about the airship, its history and its
inventor. Associated with this museum is an archive holding all re-
maining documents from the airship era - a vast amount of material.
Also, the archive preserved many writings of Count Zeppelin that
can give informative insights on the way the inventor promoted his
airship. Last but least the library at the archive holds many (if not
all) books on the subject. This allowed me to select the literature I
mentioned before not only by snowball sampling through bibliogra-
phies but by actually holding in hand, reading and then choosing or
dismissing lots of books. The only potentially very valuable source
in relation to count Zeppelin that remains unavailable are his diaries,
as these are held under lock and key by his heirs and unavailable
to the scientific community. Another huge source of information are
newspapers: especially when dealing with the reception of and pop-
ular opinions about the airship, newspapers can give a great insight
into the contemporary discourses about the Zeppelin airship. A great
number of historic newspaper editions is available either online or in
libraries.
A problematic feature, however, is the fact that many newspapers
are politically biased. This problem gets even more serious when
considering the long time difference and the fact that many of those
newspapers do not exist anymore. This makes it hard to find out
if and which bias a particular newspaper had at the given time. As
my state of the art has shown, writing on many aspects of the Zep-
pelin airship and its history is abundant. While this richness of ac-
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counts is not necessarily positive, it brings along a very positive side
effect for my research. As abundant as written pieces are, as abun-
dant are potential sources of my work. The authors before me have
done a very important step: they have screened lots of material, allo-
cated it and transcribed historical elements. At times, of course this
pre-selection has effects on the material available, yet not necessar-
ily negative ones. The piece of Warneken on the German working
class movement and their opinion about the airship [50], for example,
profits a lot of his ability (he is an ethnologist with a research focus
on the German working class) to sample historic newspapers with a
social-democratic bias. This is a work that I could not have done - at
least not with confidence that my selection is right and I do not just
end up with a coincidental sample. As this is generally the case with
newspapers (see above), I want to exclude first-hand newspaper arti-
cles from my analysis. I cite newspapers exclusively from secondary
sources that have contextualized them for myself to be sure how to
interpret them. There is one exception I want to make of this proceed-
ing: I am going to integrate some original pieces from Simplicissimus
and Der Wahre Jacob. Those were satirical magazines. They stick out
as they were very popular on the one hand and as it is not bound
to reporting actual events. Their satirical nature allows and demands
for exaggerations. Those exaggerations, while no accounts of actual
events, draw very nice pictures of mentalities and phantasies related
to the new technology.
Likewise, Clausberg [7] shows how science-fiction novels about
aerial warfare can give valuable insights into actual mind-sets of that
time. Much like that, caricatures and cartoons can sometimes give
nice examples and illustrations, which I am going to use them for.
Furthermore, the work on sources that has already been done by
other researchers is particularly valuable for the conception of my
study: I am not so much into discovering totally new facts from
the history of Zeppelin airships. Instead, I want to take a look on
known events from a different perspective. As mentioned above, the
focus lies on applying specific theoretical conceptions. Hence, in-
stead of obtaining unexploited material, re-arranging existing pieces
of the puzzle and looking at them from a different angle already pro-
vides a great benefit for my research. Apart from that, I want to
rely on writings by count Zeppelin himself: he gave various speeches
and presentations over the years. Many of those (respectively the
manuscripts) still exist and I was able to access them at the archive
in Friedrichshafen. They show nicely how Zeppelin himself used the
interpretative flexibility of his invention to promote his project. Espe-
cially the analysis on how his promotion of the airship changed over
time and in front of different audiences is a valuable and informa-
tive aspect to my research as it gives insights in the very concept of
interpretative flexibility.

6
ANALYS I S
In the following section, I will get into my actual task of analyzing
what happened to the perception and imaginaries of Zeppelin air-
ships in order for their perception to stabilize. As mentioned above,
I want to show how the process went on with an example of two
imaginaries out of many - this way having a chance of covering those
imaginaries to a promising extent.
According to the three-step methodology proposed by Bijker (see
above), this chapter consists of three parts. Section 6.1 contains an
analysis of the artifact’s interpretative flexibility, particularly concern-
ing different relevant social groups active in its construction. This
demonstration of interpretative flexibility is done with an example
of two different imaginations about the zeppelin’s future and its im-
pact. Section 6.2 continues with a description of the process of social
construction of the zeppelin. It focuses on a description of the devel-
opments around the Volksspende – in the sense that it is concerned
with Zeppelin’s situation as well as the German society as a whole
and how those factors influenced the building of a common imagi-
nary. Section 6.3 seeks for an explanation how this construction pro-
cess worked with regards to technological frames of relevant social
groups. It shows how both the technological features, but mainly the
imagination of what those features could become as well as a strong
emotional appeal of the inventor, Zeppelin himself played major roles
in the process. Section 6.4 then concludes the chapter. It makes some
final observations that are important for the discussion of the find-
ings.
6.1 imaginaries and social groups around airships
I want to begin my analysis with a look on two major imaginations
about the zeppelin that kept coming up again and again. Since the
analysis is not going to be exhaustive and will not be able to cover
even nearly all of the divides mentioned in the introduction and by
Haude and Reinick, I want to focus on two major conflicting visions
of airships. Those two perspectives are sufficient to demonstrate the
differences between opposing – or at least strongly different – atti-
tudes towards the new technology present in its early days. I think
such an exemplary demonstration about the arenas of disagreement
about the zeppelin took place in is sufficient. After an introduction to
these examples of interpretative flexibility, I will go on and talk about
the social circumstances of the development. Finally, I am going to
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have a look how the interpretation of airships eventually stabilized.
A short recapitulation: Jasanoff defined STI as
»collectively imagined forms of social life and social order
reflected in the design and fulfillment of [. . . ] scientific
and/or technological projects.« [27, 120]
In the beginning (before stabilization and closure as described by Bi-
jker) the number of those imaginaries around airships and their po-
tential effects was most likely as numerous as people around at the
time.
Figure 5: Poem: ’The Dirigible’
However, the main features of airship
technology and its potential uses that were
thought of revolved around similar aspects.
People saw airships (in general, yet the is-
sue was strongly associated with Zeppelin
airships and greatly affected their reception)
as either a tool for peace or war. While it ap-
peared that the possibility of air travel was
about to change many aspects of life[21], its
potential future as a weapon was often fo-
cus of either worries or hopes. Being an
era of nationalism and imperialism, war was
not seen with the critical distance as it is to-
day. Germany had won the last major war
against France in 1871 and German arma-
ment especially against the British fleet was
pushed with great efforts. Many found Ger-
many’s role in global politics was to be one
of the great colonial powers of the time, thus
supporting aggressive foreign politics. Oth-
ers saw those aggressive ambitions much
more critical - especially the political left at
the time believed in a future of peaceful in-
ternational exchange and coexistence.
A projection of these two visions can very
nicely be comprehended with the poem on
the right (Figure 5). It was published in Sim-
plicissimus in 1907. It displays a dialogue
between two actors talking excitedly about
a flight in an airship. The first exclaims his
delight about mankind exploring the third
dimension (air). For him, this achievement
makes all earthly things become small and
insignificant. Particularly the artificial divi-
sion of mankind through national borders is ridiculed and propa-
gated as having been overcome and no longer being effective and/or
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reasonable as borders are now apparently so easily crossed. The sec-
ond one joins in these verses. While not arguing about the greatness
of airship travel, he has quite a different take on the borders his coun-
terpart saw disappearing. To him, the easy passing of boarders brings
along an imperative to take action. In his eyes the airship is a poten-
tial weapon of mass destruction and source of superiority. Its avail-
ability has to be used to one’s advantage. Consequently, he calls for
bombs to be thrown onto the neighboring country they just entered.
From his position, this innovation in warfare marks great progress for
humankind. The cross-border connotation is a popular one. Borders
have long into the past served as demarcations of human power –
power either to deny access to an area or to keep someone there. The
book by Haude [18] is even named (at least partly, as the title can be
interpreted differently) after this aspect, titled »Grenzflüge« (Which
translates - depending on the interpretation either to ’boundary-’ or
’border’-flights). Bound to (military) forces on the ground, it seemed
obvious that those borders lost their functionality once the way could
not be obstructed anymore as it was leading through the air. While
we know today that this was just a temporary development, at the
time it was a change people saw as an obvious consequence result-
ing from air travel. Political developments of the late 18th and 19th
century did their part to even complicate the situation a bit. Having
been boundaries of power of absolutistic monarchs before, borders at
beginning of the 20th century demarcated the zones of influences of
relatively new-formed nations. The transition from kingdoms with
inhabitants to countries with citizens was grave in respect to borders:
had trespassing before been an act against just one monarch’s au-
thority was it now an act that concerned any citizen. People were,
however, not unanimous what to see in this potential to act on them.
Some considered it a chance for fraternization of people across na-
tional borders. Others instead saw a chance to use it as an offensive
act, a chance to expand one’s influence in the newly accessible dimen-
sion (and at the same time fearing the „others“ to do so themselves).
The border-crossing connotation could thus be judged upon very dif-
ferently. As the poem stems from the satirical magazine Simplicis-
simus, it is not to be taken too seriously. Nevertheless it displays very
nicely how different takes on the technology could be made. Also, it
already incorporates a very important element that we are going to
come back to: as different as the positions are on what to do with
the technology, there is agreement about the positive potential of the
technology. I am now going to proceed analyzing these two leitmotifs
further.
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6.1.1 Envisioning an era of military dominance: nationalist visions of a
new weapon
The framing of zeppelins as a weapon is obvious - It was envisioned
and designed as a weapon from the very beginning by Zeppelin. As
early as 1887 Zeppelin tried to persuade the king of Württemberg
of the necessity to develop and build ’dirigible balloons’ (original
quote: »Lenkballone«) for warfare. [11, 106 f.] The inspiration for
his early ambitions were first progresses of French engineers Renard
and Krebs who were considerably successful with their airship ’La
France’, performing several flights as well as his encounter of ob-
servation balloons in the American civil war during a trip to North
America. When Zeppelin’s vision of providing a weapon for his fa-
therland became more realistic, Germany was in the middle of los-
ing an armament-race against the British Empire. Zeppelin had be-
gun to build airships after his dismissal from military service in 1890
and filed a patent in 1895 (see above). When the British became the
dominant world power in the late 19th century, the German military
began to plan a huge expansion of their own fleet. As the British
fleet was seen as the key to British geopolitical dominance, voices
calling for Germany to build up comparable naval power were not
far. Especially emperor Wilhelm II was very fond of nationalistic and
militaristic conceptions. The plan to build up the German navy was
developed by and enforced under Tirpitz.
Figure 6: ’A peaceful Mood’
Around 1906, however, it became appar-
ent that this very expensive project was a
failure; Germany’s strategy would not be
able to force the British fleet into battles,
as their greater range would allow them
to avoid confrontations and outrun heavy
yet slow and short-ranged German ships.
While this misconception became more and
more apparent, the diplomatic damage was
done: Germany’s aggressive policy had led
to considerable damage to its foreign rela-
tions. In order to justify fleet building poli-
cies, Britain had been framed as an oppo-
nent and Germany was indeed rather iso-
lated - which made those in favor of these ag-
gressive politics even more convinced of the
need to be an at least even military power.
In 1906, the British Empire safeguarded its
position as strongest naval power by putting
into service a new type of battleship, the so-
called dreadnought. The dreadnought gave
Tirpitz’ ambitions a huge setback. (compare Stürmer [48, 295]. Origi-
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nal quote: »Schwerlich aber wäre ohne Tirpitz aus diesem Traum Re-
alität und dann, als England zum Spurt ansetzte und durch den Bau
der “Dreadnoughts” seit 1908 die Deutschen überholte, aus der Real-
ität ein strategischer Alptraum geworden.«) While it did not end the
armament race between Germany and Britain, those envisioning Ger-
many as one of the great colonial powers in the world used the Zep-
pelin as projection space for their military phantasies. The Zeppelin,
it was assumed, could easily achieve what Tirpitz’ fleet would most
likely struggle to achieve: overcome the naval supremacy of Britain.
»Germany’s future flight technology would surpass that of England’s
sea fleet«. [9, 33]Once more, a title page of Simplicissimus (Figure 6),
satirizes the scenario: the picture showing a zeppelin bombing a fleet
is entitled “a peaceful mood” (original quote: »Friedensstimmung«)
Figure 7: ’Zeppelins Shadow’
The enthusiasm for the airship
as a weapon was related to several
sub-features of the technology:
First of all, the airship seemed
unstoppable: as borders and
other physical obstacles became
meaningless in its presence, it
seemed not to be bound to any
of the „earthly“ activities: The ad-
vancing of an army or a fleet did
not form prerequisites for airship
operations. One aspect of this fact
was particularly framed against
Britain: it was envisioned that
Britain would lose its insularity.
(compare quotes from Zeppelin,
to be found in Italiaander [25,
157]: »Dieser Empörung liegt nur
die Furcht Englands zugrunde,
daß die Zeppeline seine ‘splendid
isolation’ zerstören könnten [. . . ]«
and Meyer [36, 49]: »Sie [Zeppe-
line, T.K.] werden eigens berufen
sein, die strategischen Vor- und Nachteile der geographischen Lage
der Länder zu verwischen [. . . ]«) Thereby, one of the crucial strategic
advantages of the empire and one of the main reasons for Germany’s
fleet policy seemed to simply vanish. In perspective of the English
Channel, the border-crossing imagination of air travel became partic-
ularly important since its insularity had rendered Britain in a strate-
gically superior position for centuries. Now, it seemed, this advan-
tage would vanish, an outlook much hoped for by those seeing Ger-
many in an adversary position to Britain. Again, a cartoon (Figure 7)
from Simplicissimus depicts those ambitions nicely. It is titled »Zep-
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pelin’s Shadow« and shows the British king asleep while a zeppelin’s
shadow appears over Britain.
Second, aerial warfare and particularly bombardments were imag-
ined as a miraculously precise and powerful weapon. As one would
simply have to drop bombs on the enemy’s head (or ship), it seemed
like a force that could hardly, if at all, be combatted. Thus the British
fleet could be fought withoutt risk and while still in operation air-
ships could fly over the British Channel and bomb cities.
This point led to the third argument: the ability to bomb enemy
hinterlands would enable an airship fleet to carry combat operations
far behind the frontlines. This would change war itself. The integra-
tion of civilians into battle through raids against infrastructure and
supply facilities would change war forever - what would reach a cli-
max in the infamous (nuclear) bombing raids against civilians during
World War II was already envisioned.
Those fantasies become even clearer once one turns away from ac-
tual considerations and has a look into science fiction novels of the
time that go even further: In his work »CAVETE!«, Emil Sandt [44]
drew scenarios of German airships rendering dreadnoughts useless,
forcing them to capitulate without even fighting. Rudolf Martin, in
turn, envisioned a German empire reaching to Bagdad, facilitated by
a huge airship fleet that revolutionizes transport and military in his
book »Berlin - Bagdad«. [7, 36 f.] Particularly Sandt envisioned a tactic
approach that shares quite some aspects with modern military doc-
trine: By precise attacks from the airship, enemy’s ships would be
hit at their tiny weak spot (the chimney leading right into their en-
gine room), thus destroyed with the smallest damage to the crew and
impossible to combat. In Cavete!, this leaves the British commander
in helpless fury, a scenario that must have been tempting to anyone
sharing the militaristic ardor of the time. [7, 36 f.]
6.1.2 Critical voices and different hopes: Pacifists and socialists
While nationalists praised the airship and dreamed of overpowering
Britain and its navy to a point where its situatedness as an island
would become irrelevant, others feared just that. Especially in politi-
cally left circles, namely the social democrat spectrum, serious doubts
existed. The social democrats had only recently been able to establish
themselves as a serious political power and were still very suspicious
against the government and the societal establishment. As fierce crit-
ics of the German ambitions to run an arms race against Britain to
challenge British naval supremacy, the conservative/nationalist vi-
sion of a huge airship fleet to devaluate the British fleet was more like
a nightmare than a dream. Clausberg cites the social democrat news-
paper ’Vorwärts’ with an urge to the working class not to care about
’bourgeois’ airships and much rather be concerned about its own in-
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terests - the airship’s fate would be taken care for by militarists any-
way. (original quote: »Das deutsche Proletariat hat wahrhaftig Grund
genug, sich um seine Interessen, seine Rechte zu kümmern: der Luft-
militarismus wird schon dafür sogen, das Zeppelins Erfindung nicht
verloren geht!« [6, 131]
Figure 8: ’To the party convention!’
The resentment against imperialist plans
came from two sides: first of all it was
considered to simply pursue existing pat-
terns of domination by the upper class and
reconstitution of the existing class differ-
ences. Secondly, Zeppelin’s airships were
repeatedly suspected to be exploited for air-
related militarism (»Luftmilitarismus«, [50,
63]), which was opposed by the political left.
Social democratic newspapers, for example,
react with reservations to the public ap-
peals for the donations after the Echterdin-
gen crash in 1908. Warneken [50, 64] cites a
social democratic newspaper (’Vorwärts’, Au-
gust 7th,1908) raising massive doubts about
who would profit from airships. (original
quote: »die nichtbesitzende Klasse« solle
»kaltes Blut walten lassen und sich fragen:
cui bono? Wem nützt die Zeppelinsche
Erfindung?«). Another one (’Schwäbische
Tagwacht’, August 7th, 1908) is quoted by
him [50, 77] stating its opinion that the Echterdginen crash was per-
ceived as nothing but a missed step forward towards the possession
of a new weapon system by many. (original quote: »[. . . ] das in der
Katastrophe von Echterdingen weiter nichts sieht, als eine verpaßte
Gelegenheit, demnächst zur höheren Ehre Deutschlands fremden
Völkern von oben her Dynamitpatronen an den Kopf zu werfen.«)
’Vorwärts’ called the national donation initiative after the Echterdin-
gen crash an example of „overzeal“ (original quote: »Übereifer«, Vor-
wärts“, 9th of August 1908 quoted by Warneken [50, 64]) that would
be exploited by the government as a cheap way to build up a fleet of
military airships.
The working class movement of the time shared a vision of the
international working class to join hands in order to overcome class
struggles and overthrow to existing governance structures. Quite in
contrast to both the critical voices towards both airships in general
as well as the conservative imaginations of how airships should be
used, this hope fed to an own imagination of what Zeppelin’s air-
ships were to become. The airship was perceived as a tool to increase
international transport and exchange, which would lead to peace and
tolerance. Airships were thus among others described as a „step
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towards socialism“ as they „teach the indefensibleness of national
borders“. (Original quote by Warneken [50, 66] from ’Süddeutscher
Postillon’, Jg.1908, Nr. 18, S.145: »Der ‚Lenkbare‘ ist ein gewaltiger
Schritt zum Sozialismus, mögens auch die Hurraschreier bis jetzt
noch nicht begreifen. Er lehrt die Überflüssigkeit und zugleich die
Unhaltbarkeit der Grenzen [. . . ]«). The title page of the satirical mag-
azine ’Der Wahre Jacob’ (Figure 8) nicely depicts the phantasy of a
peaceful use of the airship by workers (the picture makes reference
to the social democrats’ party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands (SPD)) national convention in September 1908 in Nuremberg
where the group in the picture is supposedly travelling. Furthermore,
there were naïve perceptions that pacifist politics would make an ex-
ploitation of airships as a weapon impossible before the technology
itself would develop far enough to be used as an actual weapon. In-
stead, it would be used as a mere tool for international exchange
(again quoted by Warneken [50, 68] this time from the newspaper
’Münchner Post’, 4th and 5th of August, 1909. Original quote: »Die
Hoffnung braucht nicht aufgegeben zu werden, daß, noch ehe ein
zuverlässiges Kriegsluftschiff in Aktion tritt, eine Vereinbarung unter
den zivilisierten Völkern erfolgt, die es ihnen möglich macht, lieber
den großen Aufgaben aufbauender Kultur nachzugehen, statt auf im-
mer neue Werke der Zerstörung zu sinnen.«). Not only were hopes
expressed that airships would not be used for war, more optimistic
articles even claimed wars to be a thing of a past. From this postimpe-
rial perspective, the airship could be praised without the risk of sup-
porting lasting militarism (original quote from ’Schwäbische Tagwacht’
on August 8th, 1908 as quoted by Warneken [50, 77]: »[. . . ] unbe-
streitbar bleibt, daß eine Erfindung, die es möglich macht, die Luft
zu durchsegeln, undter allen Umständen (sic! B.J.W.) einen Kultur-
fortschritt darstellt, und wenn diese Errungenschaft im bürgerlichen
Klassenstaat auch zunächst für den Militarismus reklamiert wird, so
ändert dies nichts daran, daß in einer künftigen Gesellschaft das
Luftschiff eben nur kulturellen Zwecken dienen wird. [. . . ]«) Need-
less to say that those naïve expectations were not fulfilled. With two
world wars and the invention of ’total war’ coming up in the 20th
century those hopes were to be proved wrong within ten years. Both
Zeppelin airships in particular in World War I and flight in general
particularly in World War II would lose their innocence sooner rather
than later. The political left was thus far from being unanimous about
airships and the appropriate attitude towards it. This partly reflects
a phenomenon that is also known as ’double loyalty’ [50, 79]: Social
democrats of the time were often trapped inside a loyalty conflict - be-
ing both citizens of a national state and members of the working class
movement fighting the dominant power structures at the same time,
they stood at both sides of the fence sometimes. Especially the de-
veloping patriotism and national identifications stood in conflict with
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an identification as a member of the working class movement that
was keen to join hands internationally. Moreover, the politically left
critique was constrained by the working class movement generally
being very keen to accentuate their progressiveness. Progress was a
shared value of the left movement. It was seen as the times turning
towards a better human race - closely linked to the belief in inter-
national fraternization and the belief that an improved general edu-
cation would discard settled societal structures and power relations.
It was seen as a tool to overcome class struggles. This position was
difficult to combine with the skepticism towards airships - which is
one of the led, as will be shown, to its dismissal. After the Echterdin-
gen crash, when a common ground to support Zeppelin was created
by the framing of the campaign as a means to save progress for all
mankind through German achievements, the newspaper ’Schwäbische
Tagwacht’ made this difficulty apparent: almost sounding relieved, it
remarked on 8th of August, 1908 Zeppelin had to be supported to
bring progress to the people, as it was obvious that it would only be
used for „cultural progress“. Finishing this remarked quoted above,
it asked, when social democrats had ever stood in the way of progress?
(original quote: » Wann hätte sich die Sozialdemokratie jemals einem
Kulturfortschritt widersetzt?« , quoted in Warneken, [50, 72])
6.1.3 The first Assembly-Process fails
These two conceptions of the airship show how the interpretative
flexibility of the airship was used differently. Also, the dates of the
publications cited show a further aspect: even in 1908, the year of the
Echterdingen crash, the discourse about what an airship actually was
was still wide open. In other words, Zeppelin’s attempts to establish
his conception of the airship as a promising new high-tech weapon
system in the public’s mind had failed. After several years of trying,
Zeppelin had still not managed to establish his invention: the efforts
promoting his airships and creating an imaginary of the airship as a
promising weapon had failed. As Zeising [53, 110] notes, the lack of
success to establish the perception of zeppelins as a weapon system
(especially with regards to efforts in 1903 and 1904) can be under-
stood from two perspectives; The technology was not mature enough
yet for people to actually believe in it as a military tool. Moreover,
the political climate and the focus on fleet building did not call for a
new weapon system until about 1908. It was still seen very critically
by many – there was no ’assembled’ imagination as to what the Zep-
pelin was or should be. Zeppelin engaged with the public through
public relation efforts very early. The support he experienced after
the Echterdingen crash did not come from nowhere but was an (un-
expected) fruit of a constant effort to involve the public and create
an attentive audience. Zeppelin gave many talks and presentation
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about his airship. Addressing different audiences, this was one way
for him to try to gather support of influential groups such as the club
of German engineers (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (VDI) [most likely
57]), the German colonial society (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft [55])
or military [56] or finally the entire German people [58].
Zeppelin had been very eager to involve the press into his cam-
paign for his airships. Right from the start he included journalists
into his efforts to promote his airship. For the maiden flight of LZ-1
in 1900, he invited Eugen Wolf, a journalist, to fly on board as one of
very few passengers ([31, 109 f.]. and [29, 76 ff.]). Wolf was picked for
two reasons: first, he was well known for pieces he had written about
trips to Africa. These journeys had made him friends with the gover-
nor of the German colonies in Africa, which Zeppelin hoped could be
exploited to promote his airships as means of transport for the Ger-
man colonies. Second, Wolf was a correspondent for the then very
important Scherl publishing house. Scherl at the time owned and
published »Die Woche«, one of the highest circulating magazines of
the time in Germany as well as the daily printed »Der Tag« and oth-
ers. At the time, Scherl was the leading publisher in Germany (orig-
inal quote: » [. . . ] beherrschte die ‘Scherlsche Meinungsfabrik’ den
deutschsprachigen Markt mit einer Auflagenhöhe von über 4 Millio-
nen« [53, 75]). As desired by Zeppelin, Wolf published an excited
report of LZ-1’s maiden flight in »Die Woche« in which he went as far
as comparing Zeppelin’s success to those of Christopher Columbus.
[31, 110] In 1903, Zeppelin was able to engage German publisher
August Scherl into a partnership. In turn for favorable placement
in Scherl’s publications, Zeppelin offered exclusive insights into his
project and advertised them to Scherl as mutually beneficial (original
quote: »Zur Durchführung meines Unternehmens [. . . ] bedarf ich
der Unterstützung durch eine weitverbreitete, in allen Schichten der
Gesellschaft gelesene Zeitschrift. Keine andere würde dem Zweck so
gut entsprechen wie “Der Tag”.« and »[. . . ] so werden sie [sic! J.Z.]
auch zugeben müssen, dass es für ihr Blatt von großem Werth [sic!
T.K.] wäre, den Werdegang eine solchen, die ganze Welt interessiren-
den [sic! J.Z.] Werkes in allen Stadien fördernd zu begleiten« both
from a letter from Zeppelin to Scherl proposing a cooperation writ-
ten on April 16th, 1903, quoted by Zeising [53, 77]). With Scherl’s
help he also initiated a first donation run, »An das deutsche Volk«
in June 1903 [6, 166]. Zeppelin had ignored warnings not to launch
the campaign during the summer holiday season and insisted on the
timing. Later that year Zeppelin published an appeal to the public to
‘save’ airship development (original quote: »Notruf zur Rettung der
Flugschiffahrt«, [6, 166]). Both appeals were not fruitful. The appeals
were quite different to later emotional appeals. Very technical, they
were of a pessimistic tone and did not try to appeal people in a pos-
itive, exciting way; »Readers of the appeal waded through confusing
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technical descriptions, only to gather the impression that they were
being asked to help an old man who was feeling sorry for himself,
not a brilliant inventor who was sacrificing everything for the good
of Germany.« [9, 26]
A third aspect of Zeppelins public relations efforts was the involve-
ment of science fiction author Emil Sandt. This »German Jules Verne«
[24, 79] was a popular author at the time. He used airships as a core
technology in his novels [7] and was one of the leading figures in de-
veloping fantasies of aerial warfare. Especially popular in Germany,
his 1906 novel »Cavete!« [44], mentioned above, explicates in a science-
fiction context what many imagined the airship to be: in the novel a
superior airship in possession of the German emperor renders the
British fleet, even their proudest battleships, use- and helpless (The
title in Latin, meaning »Be Careful!« in relation to the story line is
also a nice hint on the political implications of th book). No one less
than Zeppelin wrote the foreword of this novel. He writes the imagi-
nary contents of the novel were so much alike his own conceptions he
might have written it himself (original quote: »CAVETE! - Der Warn-
ruf an das deutsche Volk ist mir so sehr aus der Seele geschrieben,
daß manche mich durch den Glauben überschätzen könnten, ’Emil
Sandt’ sei mein Pseudonym« summarized and cited by Clausberg [7,
35]). During his cruise over Switzerland in 1908, Zeppelin, in turn, of-
fered Sandt a seat in his airship. Sandt was thus turned into a hybrid
between glowing fan and ambassador of the technology. In a 1908 an-
thology, Sandt praises airshipmen as contemporary heroes and espe-
cially Germans as leading in this pursuit to »elevate mankind« (orig-
inal quote: »Hebung der Kultur« [24]).
These ’rehearsals’ in these interactions with the various different
audiences as representation of different publics had had different suc-
cess: while his speeches were received differently, depending on the
audience and time, his appearance in newspapers was rather as an
oddity people followed curiously yet with little hope for actual suc-
cess. While Sandt as a popular author at the time did as shown above,
not everyone shared his bellicose phantasies. As a result, the dis-
course about airships was not yet closed, not even very stable. In sum,
the exemplary voices about the zeppelin show that the perception of
it were still very fragmented; while some aspired it and wished it to
become a common and technically mature artifact, others remained
skeptic and were not quite as convinced – Zeppelin so far had not
managed to introduce one common and stable perception of the zep-
pelin.
As it can be seen, none of the STIs described here, nor an entirely
different one had become predominant. As this was not the case, a
reflection of this stabilization process on the social structure of before-
hand fragmented social groups is not observed either. Stabilization
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had not occured, neither had closure. The STIs mentioned above were
still fighting over the ’right’ interpretation of the zeppelin.
6.2 the stabilization of one shared vision of the zep-
pelin
As a second section in my analysis, I will now have a look at what
happened to the perception of zeppelins: obviously, the perception of
them underwent changes from the diffuse interpretations accounted
for above. To do so, several steps will be taken: in a first one, I want to
show the constraints under which Zeppelin acted, as those certainly
influenced the process significantly. Second, I want to give a relatively
short description of what it was that happened to the perception of
the zeppelin before turning to the question how it happened. For this
question, I am then going to give insights into two other imaginar-
ies that built in Germany at the time: the perception of aviation in
general as well as the German peoples’ sense of self as a nation. Dur-
ing my research I found those two imaginaries having been crucial
for the Germans’ zeitgeist at the time and thus an important societal
factor of influence. In the third section, I am then going to tie all
of what has become apparent together into a concluding attempt to
comprehensively answer my research question.
6.2.1 Zeppelin’s struggle for - and need of- stabilization
Zeppelin’s concept for an airship was developed during a span of 25
years prior to the maiden flight of LZ-1. Even after this important date,
its breakthrough after the Echterdingen crash in 1908 took another 8
years and nearly failed. This long period of lacking appreciation and
commercial success was very hard on Zeppelin for multiple reasons.
Zeppelin’s reputation was highly at stake. He was eager to tetaliate
upon the Prussian administration for dismissing him and to restore
his honor - a very personal matter. [49, 799] The skepticism is largely
grounded in the time: Zeppelin having become a central figure of
aviation does not mean he was the only one trying. Literally hun-
dreds of technological pioneers did just as he did – but failed. As
such, failure was the obvious thing to expect; » [. . . ] as it stood in
1900, the Zeppelin project was but the next stage in the evolution of
the dirigible. Hundreds of engineers, scientists, and enthusiasts had
discussed, patented and even built lighter-than-air machines, yet they
all had failed to turn the airship into a practical flying system. Count
Zeppelin was merely joining a crowd.« [9, 24] Zeppelin’s fear of be-
ing seen as just another joke becomes obvious when one observes his
struggles for his invention to be seen as an important innovation, not
just a project. The term »project« was associated with desperate at-
tempts that were mostly doomed to fail. (for a historic take on the
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term »Projekt« and its use see Reder [41]. As Markus Krajewski put
it »success makes a project a product. It is promoted to be a shining
achievement. Failure is what will be continued to be called a project.«
(Original quote: »Was kurz davor noch Projekt heißt, wird durch
das Gelingen zum Produkt, zur glänzenden Leistung, zur gelobten
Erfindung, zum funktionierenden Geschäft promoviert. Allein, was
scheitert muss weiterhin “Projekt” heißen«. [33, 23]). Also, projec-
tors, those pursuing projects, were seen with great skepticism as most
’projects’ were unrealistic and those looking for support more swag-
gerers than innovators. (Original quote: » [. . . ] Nicht anders erklärt
sich die negative Konnotation der Projektemacher, die „insgemein
Betrüger sind“. Ihre Erwähnung erfolgt spätestens ab der zweiten
Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts „meist im abschätzigen Sinn“, der ihnen
im Verlauf der Geschichte wie selbstverständlich beigekommen ist.«
[33, 13]) In a letter asking for support from the Daimler corporation
in 1891, Zeppelin refers to his »Projekt« as one that should be ex-
cluded from the usual skepticism towards, as Zeppelin himself called
it, »airship-related projecting« (referring also to other inventors such
as Schütte-Lanz or Parseval or the ’crowd’ De Syon mentioned Zep-
pelin to be running with original quote: »dem allgemeinen abfälligen
Urteil über die Luftschiffprojektemacherei« [11, 109 f.]). In another
letter from the same year addressed to the king of Württemberg, he
refers to his invention (»Erfindung«) without, however, differentiat-
ing it clearly from the term project. [11, 112] This might indicate that
the notion’s use was a bit different than originally described by Reder
[41]. Yet even Eckener goes as far as to speak of him as a »foolish in-
ventor« (original quote: »Närrischer Erfinder« [11, 103]) in reference
to his perception by the public. Zeppelin must indeed have been sub-
ject of fierce sarcasm as Eckener goes on to tell (original quote: »Es
war die Zeit, wo der Graf als kompletter Narr verschrieen wurde und
wo man in Stuttgart höhnisch mit den Fingern auf ihn wies.« [11,
134]). These struggles not to be dismissed as a projector show how
much was at stake for Zeppelin - he ran serious risks of being dis-
honored completely and needed to succeed badly. They also help to
understand why the Prussian administration was so skeptical about
his plans. While generally staging himself as victim of bullying by
the Prussian administration because of their antipathies against him
and building an image as a martyr for the Germany’s good, Zeppelin
even expressed understanding for the rejecting attitudes of officials
related to the funding sometimes: he acknowledges that in their po-
sition as to ensure the responsible distribution of funds they had to
avoid risks and are not to give funding to projects that are too risky
as he understands and acknowledges to the frugal attitude public ad-
ministrations are to act with [11, 131]. This is why he had to rely on
other sources of funding, as he states at the same time.
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Apart from his eagerness to restore the reputation that that had led
him to risk being judged not only as failed military officer but as a
complete fool he had to react to much simpler needs: by the time of
the Echterdingen crash, Zeppelin’s economic situation had become
critical. Having invested huge sums into his pursuits over the years
and even put a mortgage on his wife’s estates, he was in bitter need
of success for simple economic reasons. The military, as has been
shown above, remained skeptical. Moreover, a joint venture that had
been initiated to ensure support for Zeppelin through major corpora-
tions like Krupp, the German Lloyd and others had failed in February
of 1908 [47, 43]. So while there were not many successes to be ac-
counted for, the range of opportunities to raise funds became smaller
– thereby the need for the general public to support Zeppelin’s project
increase by him running out of options. The need for something other
than public or industry funds had led him to many of the measures
he had taken before. The media-relations built up by Zeppelin (see
above) are a great example for that. The longer the stabilization of
the airship took, the stronger he started to use a secondary strategy
in advertising his invention. To call this a strategy may be a long shot.
An answer to the question of whether Zeppelin did in fact intend this,
as I imply, can most likely be found in his journals, yet it can not be
answered here as those journals are, as already mentioned, inacces-
sible. Colsmann, however, supports this hypothesis in his memoires.
Writing about considerations what to do after the donation of 1908 he
describes Zeppelin as favoring military use of his technology (origi-
nal quote: »Selbstverständlich standen für Zeppelin militärische Auf-
gaben der Luftschiffe im Vordergrunde des Interesses« [8, 26]). This
remark, referring to the time after the national donation, is one strong
indicator that Zeppelin never let go of his original conception of the
zeppelin to primarily be a weapon. While having focused his pro-
motion attempts on other features, he obviously never let go of the
imagination of providing his fatherland with a revolutionary arms
system. Furthermore the proficient handling of his public relations
lets it appear as very likely that this was not coincidental but orches-
trated on purpose. Zeising [53, 127] speaks of »versed« handling of
the press by Zeppelin (original quote: » [. . . ] Zeppelins versierten
Umgang mit den Medien [. . . ] «) when analyzing the different actors
involved into the marketing for Zeppelin.
Zeppelin started to do something that I would like to call a second
wave of rehearsals in order to finally achieve an assembled imagi-
nary. Pinch and Bijker, in turn, pragmatically call it »advertising« [40,
427] In these rehearsals, he framed his airships not with a particular
purpose for which they were an apt tool, but remained more vague
about possible applications. Actively seeking for support, he turned
to more and more different audiences. Over time, he opened the dis-
course about his airship up. By staying vague about its purpose and
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reframing this discourse, he was able to start over and achieve greater
affection by different groups. Interestingly, he ran this “backup strat-
egy” parallel to his focus of advertising his technology as a future
weapon. There is no clear break to be seen - rather a fading from a
positioning as a military instrument towards an open framing of the
airship as a progressive instrument to subdue nature. Zeppelin had
very early started to diversify his depiction of the future uses of his
technology. In a speech given in Stuttgart in 1895 [57], he already
advertised his airship as a multi-purpose instrument. Although title,
venue and audience are not known, his addressing of the royal war
ministry and the speech having been given in Stuttgart gives reason to
assume he pitched his project to the king of Württemberg at the occa-
sion. As it is known that the king of Württemberg supported a talk of
him in front of the VDI that year, it is to be assumed this was the main
audience. While stressing his primary vision of building a weapon
by citing studies in his favor on this issue (original quote: »[. . . ] das
Gutachten der Komission glaubt in diesem Falle an die thatsächliche
[sic! T.K.] Verwendbarkeit meiner Erfindung für Kriegszwecke« [57,
2]). However as he was already assuming to be rejected he provided
a number of other purposes his invention could be put to use for
(original quote: »Sollte dem königlichen Kriegsministerium auch jetzt
nicht der für das Heer allein anzunehmenden Nutzen noch nicht groß
genug erscheinen [. . . ] wegen der auf anderen Gebieten zu gewinnen-
den Vorteile dennoch erwarten«[57, 2 f.]). Explicitly, he mentioned:
• The fleet, for which airships were to serve in multiple functions
• Seafaring by being able to fly rescue missions and conduct map-
ping tasks
• Colonialism by providing fast long distance transportation over
unexplored terrain
• Geography, especially by providing transportation to the center
of Africa and the north pole
• Meteorology
• Worldwide mail services - again by providing very fast and di-
rect ways of transportation
[all above from 57, 3 and 4] This early adoption to a broader set of
possible interest is already very interesting. It shows nicely how Zep-
pelin was ready to abandon his own conceptions of the technology in
order to open the concept up to different interpretations and imagina-
tions of its benefits. Without addressing specific audiences, this can
be seen as very clever as it is opening up an entirely new path: it takes
away the need to fully convince enthusiasts of its use as a weapon. As
Zeppelin mention explicitly the mere fact of the airship to being able
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to fly relatively fast opened up a vast field of potential uses. This way
his audience did not have to be convinced of the airship’s quality as
a weapon (which were actually disproven in World War 1 between
1914 and 1917, when Zeppelin’s airships were dismissed from mili-
tary service for their lack of effectiveness) or of liking the inherently
militaristic character of weapons in order to support the project of
developing the technology. This strategy gained more and more im-
portance. Over the time, it seems the longer a stabilizations was not
taking place, Zeppelin increased putting emphasis on other potential
purposes. There is not a single event turning things around, much
more it was a smooth transition from a military technology towards
a more open concept. With the progress of time, Zeppelin’s strategy
of opening up became even more sophisticated. At first, Zeppelin of-
fered, as referred to above, alternative means of using airships if not
for aerial warfare. Over time, he almost entirely abandoned that way
of speaking about his technology. More and more, Zeppelin moved
away from associating his airships with a given application at all. In-
stead, a different leitmotif was created: the conquest of air is used - a
much more open notion.
It is also worthwhile noting that this ’opening’ is also a turning
back to a more fundamental interpretation of the technology. As
mentioned in chapter 6.1, ’progress’ was a notion that was widely
agreed on. So do the two fictional characters in the ’The Dirigible’
poem (Figure 5). Turning away from specific expectations towards
the technology enabled the technology to become accepted by many:
it left more room to the individual imaginations of different actors.
This opened up an entire new potential audience: it was a huge
step towards embracing antimilitaristic sources of influence. Poten-
tial supporters that despised militaristic and imperialistic ambitions
were given a reason to support the technology. The consequences of
this adjustment become apparent when Zeppelin, this time at the Ger-
man colonial society in Berlin (and just after the disassembly of his
first prototype LZ-1) stepped back from these aggressive tones and
instead referred to the entire mankind as the beneficiary of his in-
vention (original quote: »[. . . ] aber die Menschheit wird doch durch
einen anderen Erlangen, was ich ihr bieten wollte.« [55, 10]). While
still mentioning the airship’s potential as a weapon, Zeppelin focused
on the airship as a means of transport and stressed the multitude of
purposes the airship could be used for (original quote: »Wie mannig-
faltig sind die mit solchen Fahrzeugen zu lösenden Aufgaben [. . . ]«
[55, 14]). He tried to find a balance between patriotic and empathic
language, mentioning the airship would be beneficial for science in
general while still articulating his urge to supply his fatherland with
the technology to its individual benefit (original quote:»[. . . ] dem
deutschen Vaterlande und der Wissenschaft im allgemeinen [. . . ]« [55,
15]). This process of opening started early and proceeded gradually
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until in the end Zeppelin did not even mention particular applica-
tions anymore. Applications were referred to very vaguely. Instead,
the ability to fly, the ’conquest of the air’ became the central theme of
his argumentation. Even when vaguely referring to military purposes
he added that those served to conserve peace. (original quote: »Mit
froher Zuversicht darf das deutsche Volk demnach annehmen, daß
es sich mit seiner hochherzigen Spende einen gangbaren Weg zur
wahrhaftigen Eroberung des Luftmeeres aufgetan hat, daß es bald im
Besitz von Luftschiffen sein wird, die zur Erhöhung der Wehrkraft
und damit zur Erhaltung des Friedens beitragen und in mancherlei
Weise dem Verkehr, der Erderforschung und allerlei Aufgaben der
Kultur dienen« [59])
This behavior can be interpreted as a move towards what SCOT calls
»redefinition of problem«[40, 427]: withdrawing from an interpreta-
tion that was too specific to be agreed upon by a sufficient number
of people, Zeppelin turned towards a different facet of his invention.
By promoting (or, again, as Pinch and Bijker would have said ad-
vertising) it not as a machine bound to a specific purpose, but as
a means to achieve ’progress’. To develop an own interpretation of
what progress looked like was thus left to the eye of the beholder.
However, progress was something that (almost) anyone could agree
upon as a goal worth while pusuing. And while the conflict that had
prevented agreement before was not settled, it was »seen« [40, 427]
as having disappeared.
6.2.2 The tide turns – a wave of support and popularity in 1908
In the process of stabilization that leaned onto this rephrasing, the
year 1908, then, became a crucial time. It would eventually be seen
as the breakthrough year for the zeppelin, though stabilization of a
zeppelin-STI would still take until 1909 to occur. Having built his 4th
prototype, Zeppelin was optimistic that the military would finally
purchase two of his ships and reimburse him for his expenses thus
far. After the tests with LZ-3, the military had eventually agreed to in-
vest into Zeppelin’s project and support him. Prerequisite for the pur-
chase of LZ-3 and LZ-4was, however, for one of the two ships to prove
that it could travel 24 hours non-stop. Pleased with the first ascents
of his new ship LZ-4, Zeppelin decided to go on a pre-test ride over
Switzerland before the 24-hour-endurance test. This cruise was a first
step towards the zeppelin’s triumph. The unexpected appearance
over Switzerland was subject to extensive reporting in newspapers.
Moreover, international tourists spread the word not only in Switzer-
land but called for international attention. The unforeseen success
– and especially the attention it caused internationally – caught the
Germans’ attention. Consequently, the entire country was expecting
the endurance test curiously. While there were still quite some critical
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voices, the zeppelin was taken seriously in terms of the potential it
had unfolded over Switzerland. Criticism related to the potential and
the opportunities that came along with the technology, which was al-
ready quite a contrast to the ridiculing comments that had not taken
Zeppelin seriously.
When LZ-4 burnt to ashes near Echterdingen, the »epiphany« [6,
47] of the German people took its course. As already mentioned, the
catastrophe transformed into a moment of triumph – the German peo-
ple united through the donation to Zeppelin’s benefit. As excited the
crowds were to see the zeppelin, as devastated were they when they
learned about LZ-4’s accident. The Echterdingen crash was perceived
not as an accident but a national tragedy. Strange enough for this to
happen, people went even further in identifying with Zeppelin and
his invention and financed his further activities by the spectacular
Volksspende.
In the following months, the different perceptions of the zeppelin
consolidated into great appreciation for it. Zeppelin undertook trips
through the entire German Reich and was saluted by excited masses
wherever he would travel. [42, 44 f.] Reinicke explores how Zeppelin
used various long flights after the national donation to contriubte to
the excitement for his ships and talks about »the politics of the long
trips« (original quote: »Die Politik der großen Fahrten«,[42, 43 ff.]).
Those culminated in a trip to Berlin that can be interpreted as the last
step missing for acceptance truly everywhere in the country. Even
in Berlin, capital of Prussia and thus far away from his home turf
(as for intra-German frictions, see the example of Wilhelm’s quotes
about Zeppelin in chapter 2), he was celebrated. Reinicke [42, 50]
quotes a Berlin newspaper on Zeppelin’s visit to Berlin (in one of his
ships) on August 29th and 30th, 1909; »[. . . ] huge crowds are stand-
ing in front of the hotel ’Kaiserhof’ [. . . ]. Again and again, Zeppelin
has to show himself on the balcony. The excitement equals that of
a national event.« (original quote: »Gewaltige Menschenmassen ste-
hen vor dem Hotel “Kaiserhof” [. . . ] Immer wieder muss sich Graf
Zeppelin auf dem Balkon zeigen. Die Aufregung ist wie bei einem
großen nationalen Ereignis.«) Reinicke also quotes Zeppelin Eckener
stating this trip to be the final manifestation of the Zeppelin appre-
ciation (original quote: »Mit dieser Fahrt [. . . ] war der Ruhm des
Zeppelinschiffs, [. . . ] fest begründet.« Reinicke [42, 52]quotes this as
to stem from Eckener (according to Reinicke [11, 232]. I was not able
to find this quote in the original book as this one has only 183 pages.
However, there are other similar accounts of Eckener, yet not fitting
as perfectly. Thus I assume it to be a mistaken quote by Reinicke)).
And while accidents remained common in the following years, these
were not able to destroy the fascination and support for the zeppelin
any more. [11, 170 ff.]
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This moment can be interpreted as closure. Together with the fact
that the military now accepted the technology and included it into
the armed forces, the appreciation by the population of Berlin and
the monarchy were a somewhat final step. When even in Berlin, the
capital of the ever so critical Prussia, he was received with nothing
but excitement, one can state the support for Zeppelin had become
a predominant sentiment. The zeppelin was perceived as a national
artifact and its first appearance over the nation’s capital celebrated as
a major event. While the previous argumentation has already pointed
towards elements of stabilization processes as described by SCOT, it
is now to be examined in more depth how this stabilization occured
exactly.
6.3 understanding the fast change in the zeppelin per-
ception
Step three in the analysis is now searching for the reasons of this
change in the perception of the zeppelin. While the Echterdingen
crash was apparently the tipping point for the change in the percep-
tion of it, the reasons obviously lie deeper. As mentioned before, the
sudden emergence of appreciation for it after the cruises over Switzer-
land and the 24-hour-test was all but self-evident.
6.3.1 The Conquest of Air as unifying Momentum
As mentioned in section 6.2.1, Zeppelin had changed the subject of
the discourse about his invention. Over the time, the term ’conquest
of the air’ became a common expression for what it was that should
be achieved by airships and planes. Once Zeppelin recognized the
potential public support after the crash, he advertised a ’national do-
nation’. In an appeal for support [58], Zeppelin spoke only about the
»conquest of the air« (original quote: »Eroberung des Luftmeeres«).
His personal vision of a weapon is mentioned only in passive form
when he claims the airship capable of securing peace by improving
military defense. In turn, by emphasizing the meaning of his technol-
ogy as a vehicle and especially as a »tool for cultural tasks« (original
quote: »Dass es [das deutsche Volk, Anm. T.K.] bald im Besitz von
Luftschiffen sein wird, die zur Erhöhung der Wehrkraft und damit
zur Erhaltung des Friedens beitragen. Und in mancherlei Weise dem
Verkehr, der Erderforschung und mancherlei Aufgaben der Kulturen
dienen.« [58, 00:40] ).
This notion, sounding odd in its English translation, has distinct
meaning in this discourse. In its original German phrasing it comes
very close to common formulations of the time in the left spectrum
that depicted human flight, the conquest of air or airships in particu-
lar as a „cultural progress“ (original quote: »Kulturfortschritt«, com-
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pare Warneken [50] as well as Sandt, quoted above). Also, I want to
point to the poem ’The Dirigible’ (Figure 5) again: although not even
concerned with the issue, the positive character of progress is not
questioned by either of the positions. It is the question of what the
apparent progress is to be used for that causes friction between the
two protagonists. Moving back from his personal opinion towards
a position that was broadly shared was a clever move by Zeppelin.
It has at least to be suspected that this opening of the discourse has
been pursued by Zeppelin consciously: the 24-hour test he had at-
tempted to had formally failed. Thus, after the crash at Echterdingen,
Zeppelin and his project once again faced ruin. In other words he
needed any support he could get. As the acknowledgement for his
achievements and the formal recognition of the 24 hour test being
successful despite the crash [11, 164] came only some time later (and
most likely mainly under the pressure of the public mood), Zeppelin
must have felt like running out of options after the crash.
»At Echterdingen, the trajectory of government commis-
sions, military evaluations, and preliminary funding had
finally come to an end. AS he inspected the wreckage,
there was no reason for the seventy-year-old Graf [Zep-
pelin, T.K.] to expect to continue his life’s work.« [16, 14]
Desperation, however, lasted only a very short timespan: within hours
of the Echterdingen crash, it became apparent that Zeppelin’s flight
along the Rhine had deeply touched people. Within short time, peo-
ple started donating money. While the accounts about the actual start
of the donation vary, its extent is beyond dispute. Within 24 hours af-
ter the crash, the financial losses due to the loss of LZ-4were overcom-
pensated. When Zeppelin returned to Friedrichshafen after the crash,
his assistant Eckener welcomed him with congratulations. When Zep-
pelin reacted surprised, Eckener informed him that the beginning do-
nations had already reached hundreds of thousands of Marks (orig-
inal quote: »Ich begrüßte den Grafen [. . . ] mit den Worten: “Ich
gratuliere, Exzellenz!” Er schaute mich verdutzt an; als ich ihm dann
aber sagte, daß bereits während der Nacht mehrere Hunderttausend
Mark als Spende für einen Neubau eingegangen seien [. . . ] « [12, 24
f.]) The public attention Zeppelin had tried to attract for years was
there at once. The press covered the event abundantly. The crash was
not referred to as a failure, but as a national tragedy. Zeppelin was
very aware of the opportunity he faced. Having tried to create a com-
passionate mood for his invention in the public before, he knew about
the potential this situation brought along. Likewise, he knew about
the challenges that were still to face. In an address to the general pub-
lic released as a gramophone recording (that was made available to
the general public by printing it in newspapers [53, 129 f.]), Zeppelin
did something that can only be called smart in retrospect. Although
the survival of his company and even a considerable strengthening
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of it were already apparent, Zeppelin asked for further contribution.
In turn, he endowed the technology to the people. Explicitly, he men-
tions the meaning of the public contributions for his success and the
continuation of his project as well as the prosperity the German na-
tion achieved through it - and thereby through its own will for action.
Thereby, he made his project everyone’s. As his technology had just
proven reliable and imaginations about the great future of the airship
reached a climax, this gift was greatly appreciated.
Here, we can observe how - contrary to what is proposed as the
common way by SCOT [2, 283] - a new STI emerged. The prospect of
producing and owning a precious and potentially powerful techno-
logical artifact as a nation fired people’s imagination. All of a sud-
den, their new, commonly shared imaginary of a German zeppelin
to bring ’progress’ into the world made them all one giant relevant
social group. Instead of being separated by social status or political
affiliations, people literally stood side-by-side chanting »Deuschland,
Deutschland über alles [...]«. That way, the zeppelin had become a
means of unification for the German people that all of a sudden de-
veloped strong nationalist sentiments. The notion that STI »encode
and reinforce particular conceptions of what a nation stands for« [27,
120] could not be more fitting. In this moment, ’Germany’ stood for a
strong community that was capable of pulling together and making
unique achievements.
Figure 9: Poem: ’Zeppelin at Müggelsee’
Zeppelin aptly used the damaged self-
confidence of the young empire: Equip-
ping the German masses with the feeling
of holding a worldwide admired technol-
ogy in their hands and repeatedly prais-
ing the great achievement of their united
efforts, he created a mood that was pre-
cisely what people desired - the torn na-
tional pride of those days was a fertile soil
for the seed Zeppelin planted. While the
monetary difficulties Zeppelin had faced
had already been history, this step of sym-
bolically handing back the feeling of ’own-
ing’ the technology created a protective impulse. This protection
through the public proved very valuable: While the general public
was in plain excitement about Zeppelin’s airships all of a sudden, the
mood in the Berlin government circles had not turned just as quickly.
Especially the military was all but convinced and had its own inter-
pretation of what had been shown by the events: »The zeppelin’s in-
tended military purchasers, whose main condition, an uninterrupted
twenty-four-hour flight, had not been met, agreed that the disaster
revealed the rigid airship’s inability to adverse weather.« [16, 15]
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Only when it became apparent that the zeppelin craze was not a
flash-in-the-pan, the Prussian government ceased its resistance against
Zeppelin - yet more for inner-political reasons than out of conviction.
As the excitement for Zeppelin could not be contained, other ways
of treating it hat to be found. Hence, the government finally came to
the conclusion to accept Zeppelin’s attempt as successful and release
the funds he had been promised in case of a successful flight of 24
hours. Also, the military bought LZ-3 and ordered a further airship,
LZ-5. Having demonstrated good will towards Zeppelin, the govern-
ment then tried to re-gain control over the situation. The government
had tried to get hold of the »Volksspende« by trying to control the
use of funds. The Prussian crown prince proposed the installation of
a board that was to be called ’Reichskomitee’ to oversee the use of
the immense funds. The so-called ’national donation’ for Zeppelin
had raised over 6 million marks that were now in the lone possession
of Zeppelin. It was thus proposed that a board should oversee the
spending of those funds in the best possible way. Zeppelin was able
to fight this motion off. An important role was played by the public
- an uproar went through the empire; »News of the crown prince’s
Reichskomitee [. . . ] loosed a storm of indignant criticism throughout
Germany that revealed a defiant, unexpectedly republican opposition.
[. . . ] What was so „beautiful, glorious“ about the Volksspende, the
correspondent asserted, was that rich and poor gave money „with-
out being asked“. In their spontaneous gesture, the German people
had shown „confidence in their own power.« [16, 33 - the parenthesis
mark citations from the liberal newspapers Bremenr Nachrichten by
Fritzsche] Zeppelin’s capability to use this to his favor [11, 163] inter-
fered with the Prussian ambitions and left Zeppelin and his authority
over the funds independent. So when the emperor and the Prussian
government (Eckener speaks of »Berliner Kreise«, »Berlin circles« in
opposition to »manche Kreise Süddeutschlands«, »certain circles in
southern Germany« [11, 163]) failed to make the Zeppelin craze an
element of their influence, they at least took the lead to profit from
acting in favor of the popular mood. It was perceived as if now that
the people had saved the airship project, the Prussian government
wanted to take over control - which was seen as an offense. The
poem »Zeppelin am Müggelsee« (Figure 9, Müggelsee is a lake in
Berlin where, as this poem jokingly claims, Zeppelin should move
his operations to, another reference to frictions between Prussia and
southern Germany), published in ’Der Wahre Jacob’ satirizes the Prus-
sian administration’s behavior; claiming how the Berlin ’committee’
wants to move the zeppelin production to Berlin in order to being able
to observe it better and to apply their “wisdom” to it. The author con-
cludes by predicting the history books would once state without the
crucial Prussian support, the zeppelin would never have come into
being.
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This episode, in turn, emphasizes the reciprocity of influence be-
tween ’trechnical’ and ’social’, how »technology is socially shaped
and society is technically shaped« [2, 288]: The unity the zeppelin had
caused in the first place yould now, in turn be of help for it. When
the Prussian government tried to pocket the control and sovereignity
over the zeppelin, the social structure it had created and regarded it
has its own protected Zeppelin to lose his invention to ’the Prussians’.
6.3.2 Meanwhile in Germany: two different imaginaries in the making
The success of his discourse-opening strategy had a very vitalizing
effect on Zeppelin’s endeavor. It enabled Zeppelin to benefit from
two other assemblage processes that had been running parallel to his
efforts of establishing his airship - and would then become stepping
stones for the zeppelin’s success.
The first one was about aviation in general: aviation, meaning all
kinds of human flight, was the technological frontier at the turn of
the century. Considered an old dream of mankind, first successful
attempts to beat gravity triggered great efforts to make it repeat- and
controllable. Balloons were the first technology enabling flight (at
least in the European context of the late 18th/early 19th century.)
Only decades after the Montgolfier brothers’ first ascents were first
heavier-than-air attempts successful. At the turn of the 20th century,
heavier than air flying machines, then called aeroplanes, were just
at the point of becoming reliable apparatuses. Nevertheless, those
machines were still just gliders. The first powered flight was (so the
common narrative) not achieved until 1903 when the Wright brothers
flew first at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. Flight, thus was the greatest
challenge to be solved by technology in the near future of the time.
There were, however, ups and downs in the perception of this chal-
lenge. By the turn of the century it was already considered feasible -
which did not mean it could be achieved easily. The struggle to actu-
ally do it cost a lot of the initial public attention in the first years of
the 20th century: »All across the continent, the initial flicker of public
interest in flight had given way to disappointment and boredom. Fig-
ures acknowledged today as major pioneers, such as Otto Lilienthal
and Clément Ader, were at the time mostly known for their failures,
and their work attracted but a few thousand believers.« [9, 25] Zep-
pelin’s attempts to raise funds through a public donation and a lottery
fell in 1903 right into the time of this public fatigue - in this context
it is better explicable why it went so poorly. It was after 1903 that
the public interest in flight began to grow again: the Wright brothers
had achieved a milestone in controlled powered flight and nourished
dreams of human flight. In the following years, aeroplanes became
more and more powerful and reliable. Soon, the Wrights were com-
peted by several European pioneers who were able to build powered
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flyers themselves. The success stories in relation to those flyers stim-
ulated the perception of flight and led to a revitalization of peoples’
fascination for the subject. After 1903, the technologies of heavier-
than-air flight soon became sophisticated enough to work with some
reliability. Thus, flight did not vanish anymore and became a constant
phenomenon that evolved and produced news and records more or
less constantly, thereby ensuring the public’s curiosity remained ac-
tive.
A second perception that had been in motion was the self-understanding
of Germany as a nation. After its unification in the German Reich
in 1871, in the late 1890s Germany began to fancy a „place in the
sun“ [16, 35], meaning it developed ambitions to become a colonial
power. Yet these ambitions brought along great trouble. The develop-
ments in this context were able to shake the German national unity
(as far as it existed in the first place) hard. Germany had begun
to build up of a fleet that was meant to being able to at least chal-
lenge the British. This project, which had been pursued at huge costs
turned out to be doomed to fail in the first decade of the 20th cen-
tury. Thus German ambitions had to be adjusted to far less ambitious
goals while still costing enormous amounts of money. Meanwhile,
foreign policies had gotten a mess for the sake of this armament: In
order to justify the fleet build-up, German politicians increasingly
depicted the British as an opponent that one would have to face in
war. This rhetoric, primarily intended to summon support by Ger-
man citizens, damaged the formerly good relations to Britain (Em-
peror Wilhelm II. was a grandchild of Queen Victoria). When Russia
and France resisted German advances after the change for the worse
in German-British relations, it appeared as if enemies surrounded
Germany. Moreover, apparently the enemies would even unite: King
Edward of England was received in Paris friendlier than any English
potentate before him, which qualified as a worrisome act for many
Germans and the political climate became chilly. As de Syon puts
it nicely: »This resounding slap in the face came in response to Ger-
many’s ongoing naval armament program, which threatened Britain’s
dominance of the seas. Old uniforms were dusted off, and while
sabers were not yet being rattled, they were being polished - and the
count [Zeppelin, T.K.] was intent to forging an entirely new one.« [9,
31] Finally Emperor Wilhelm II managed to make things even worse
than they already were in October of 1908. Having unwillingly pro-
voked France already during the Moroccan Crisis in 1906, he stum-
bled into what has been known as the Daily-Telegraph-Affair: in an
interview that was published in the English newspaper Daily Tele-
graph, Wilhelm managed to upset virtually anyone. Claiming he
belonged to a minority of anglophiles in Germany both managed to
stoke British fear of the German armament campaign and to fall into
his own government’s back that had campaigned rather anti-British
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as mentioned above. Further, about his positions and influences dur-
ing the Boer War were both able to further estrange France and Russia
and be taken as presumptuousness by the British. The consequences
of the public uproar reached as far as demanding the emperor’s res-
ignation and the von Bülow government stepping down.
To sum it up, in 1908 Germany pretty much faced the disenchant-
ment of its imperial phantasies - the prior rather stable imaginary of
Germany as an imperial power had gotten severe cracks. And to top
it all, it gave the impression to the inside as to the outside that its
leaders were incompetent and inconsiderate.
The combination was hard on Germans’ patriotism and self-esteem.
One might go as far as to state that the national unity of Germany
that had developed since the foundation of the German empire in
1871 was on a way of de-stabilizing itself again. Eckener’s judgement
comes to a similar evaluation without even considering the Daily-
Telegraph-Affair. In his opinion events before 1908, particularly the
Moroccan crisis had already been enough to devastate the German
people. Trying to contextualizing the zeppelin enthusiasm and ap-
preciating it, he does acknowledge that in order for people to get
swept away like the Germans did in 1908 the situation has to be un-
bearable (original quote: » Aber von solchen begeisterten Ideen und
Stimmungen werden die Völker immer nur dann fortgerissen, wenn
die Zustände unhaltbar und unerträglich geworden sind. [. . . ] das
deutsche Volk fühlte sich [. . . ] in seiner Existenz bedroht. Da wurde
ihm des Zeppelin-Schiff [. . . ] zu einer Art Symbol der nationalen Ein-
heit und der deutschen Leistungsfähigkeit, die ein moralisches Recht
auf einen “Platz in der Sonne” zu begründen schien.« [12, 26])
Tying into Zeising’s comment about the time not having been right
before [53, 110, cited above], these two developments show exactly
how the change in strategy in combination with the course of history
paid out for Zeppelin. While just a couple of years before neither had
aerial transportation seemed imaginable nor was Germany in need of
a new military technology, all of a sudden both came true. Thereby,
Zeppelin’s sudden success in the summer of 1908 hit the zeitgeist
precisely. In the meantime, a problem for which the zeppelin seemed
to fit had opened up by the setbacks of Tirpitz’ naval efforts and the
insensitive foreign policies.
Figure 10 shows an attempt to visualize this development. Inspired
by a visualization by Felt [14, Figure1, 19], it attempts to connect the
entanglements of those three imaginaries – the two just mentioned
and the one of the zeppelin with a temporal dimension. In that study,
Felt concludes that
»First, observing the debates, it seems that [. . . ] experi-
ences have merged into a shared sociotechnical imaginary,
allowing participants to imagine a role for themselves [. . . ]
Second, the analysis shows that it would be wrong to as-
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Figure 10: Intertwined assembly processes
sume that these two technological experiences were used
to simply directly parallel them with [a third one, T.K]
[. . . ] Third, it shows how deeply pre-existing sociotech-
nical imaginaries matter when new technologies enter a
national territory. Such shared imaginaries manage to cre-
ate a feeling of collectivity – a “we”-experience – with
a shared technopolitical history and common reference
frames needing no further explanation. And even if it
is questioned and counter arguments are put forward, it
remains astonishing robust.« [14, 10 ff.]
All of these three points can be traced to the zeppelin case: People
could indeed merge experiences of their excitement for flight as well
as the prospect to do their country a service into an active role of
using what they had encountered as a starting point for support for
Zeppelin. As mentioned above, it was not so much one interpreta-
tion, one STI to become dominant but a new one emerging. This new
imaginary, however did not come from nowhere, either. It developed
out of preexisting ones that were used as stepping stones for a new
development. Hence it was crucial for Zeppelin to allow that cross-
referenc between STIs by stepping back from his particular depiction
of the artifact put into use. By acknowledging his airships to be more
than just a weapon and everyone to develop his or her own interpreta-
tion of what the zeppelin should mean for him or her, he allowed for
such entanglements to happen. Further, all three STIs depicted above
are not running parallel but with each other: the progress of flight
somewhere outside Germany would emphasize the national need to
equalize that progress as a nation. Vice versa, the capability to sup-
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port the development of the zeppelin in such a powerful way would
reflect on the other two imaginaries and so on. In consequence, then,
a strong social cohesion in form of a new nationalist sentiment es-
tablished and was strong enough to bear the setbacks to come after
it – namely the crashes of DELAG-ships in the following years after
1908. Agreeing with SCOT, after the stabilization, the zeppelin’s per-
ception was not easy to be shaken up. As the zeppelin had become
such a strong symbol not only for technological progress but for the
independence of the German people from their monarchy, it was not
easily abandoned.
6.3.3 The Peoples’ Emperor
The breakthrough of his invention was not witout consequence for
Zeppelin’s personal life and reputation. From one day to another, he
was no more subject to ridicule but a popular hero. Not only was the
motion of installing a committee considered sleazy against the public,
but as dishonorable towards Zeppelin. Zeppelin became a person of
enormous popularity, especially with the general public, leading to
him being called the peoples’ emperor (original quote: »Volkskaiser«,
[18, 250]). His popularity in the public is nicely shown by the appreci-
ation by the Prussian authorities. As mentioned above, Zeppelin was,
called the greatest German of the century and he was decorated with
the »black eagles’s medal«, (»Schwarzer Adlerorden«). However, he
was not (as expected) made a prince. The explanation is simple: Wil-
helm was most likely afraid of Zeppelin’s popularity [42, 122] - and
was likely right to be so. In many aspects, Zeppelin incorporated val-
ues that people actually expected to find in the emperor. His noble
descent came to play a huge role here: Zeppelin, from an ancient no-
ble lineage, was a rather conservative figure. Zeppelin is referenced
as having stated nobility was duty and understanding himself as a
man of honor (original quote: »Das Privileg des Adels besteht darin,
daß er das Gefühl der Pflicht gegenüber dem Gemeinwohl in beson-
ders starkem Maße haben muß.« and »So wurde er [Zeppelin, T.K.]
[. . . ] als “wahrer Edelmann” geschätzt.« cited by Mienert [38, 113 and
124]). Obviously being persistent, calm, determined and modest, for
many he was a model aristocrat. This picture became meaningful in
contrast to Wilhelm II; Wilhelm’s political misfortune was notorious
and reached an unprecedented climax during the Daily Telegraph
affair in late 1908. Zeppelin seemed a matching part for the short-
comings of the emperor. His popularity eventually reached a point
where Zeppelin had to calm people himself in order not to destroy
his restored reputation by threatening the emperor’s position.[42, 176
ff.]. Reinicke goes as far as to compare the support movement for Zep-
pelin with revolutions in other countries. He argues that differently
from masses storming the Bastille in 1789, for example, the events in
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Echterdingen created the movement that unified Germans into one
people and created a true national sentiment (similarly, yet only as a
side note, Eckener compares the zeppelin enthusiasm with the French
revolution [12, 26]. For this perspective speaks the fact that the Ger-
man national anthem (»Das Lied der Deutschen«) came in fashion
just in these days. Its famous first verses »Deutschland, Deutschland
über alles« were sung spontaneously over and over again by thou-
sands of spectators [18, 238 ff.] – instead of the national anthem back
then, »Heil dir im Siegerkranz« which does not focus on the nation
but in praising the emperor. It is even mentioned that »Das Lied der
Deutschen« was used as a personal anthem for Zeppelin. »Das Lied
der Deutschen« was later made national anthem in the Weimar re-
public and serves this purpose (nowadays with a different text - only
verse 3 is sung today, verse one (»Deutschland, Deutschland über
alles«) is forbidden due to its misuse during the Third Reich) until
today.
As shown above, Zeppelin was well aware of his popularity and
knew very well to use it for his own good in his struggles against the
Prussian administration. It would be wrong, however, to conclude
he was taking sides from this behavior. Zeppelin saw himself as an
aristocrat and was far from fraternizing too much with the working
class. While Warneken [50, 79] writes about »divided loyalties« of
workers between the social democratic subculture and evolving na-
tionalism uniting under the otherwise unpopular Wilhelminian sys-
tem, the same is certainly true for Zeppelin. From early on, Zep-
pelin targeted the people’s attention through specific coverage by
mass media and used an exclusive publisher to do so. The publi-
cations of the Scherl group were the ones that covered Zeppelin’s
first attempts from early on with the greatest effort as well as opti-
mism. While more serious papers such as the Frankfurter Zeitung
and its lead correspondent at Lake Constance at the time (Hugo Eck-
ener) remained skeptic, the Scherl yellow press publications were re-
porting excitedly. [53, 75 f.] Zeppelin was well aware of that and
even initiated a partnership with Scherl promoting mutual benefits
by trading exclusive information and access to his project for guar-
anteed media coverage. [53, 77] However when accused of taking
advantage of the lower classes support, he replied to a Prussian of-
ficer that this was true and a pity, yet he saw himself as forced to
do so as long as the state would not listen to him (original quote:
»[...]als einer der von Berlin aus kommandierenden Offiziere einmal
eine leise Anspielung machte, dass der Graf Zeppelin “sich von der
Stimmung der törichten Volksmenge tragen lasse”, da meinte er un-
mutsvoll: “Ich muß es mir leider gefallen lassen, solange die Herren
in Berlin so wenig Verständnis und Einsicht zeigen”« [11, 154 f.]). As
an employer he is described as caring as well as demanding and au-
thoritative, with a patriarchic habit towards his working force [42, 160
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f.]. In 1894 already he had made some notes in his diary concerning
the growing tensions between entrepreneurs and working class. He
took a rather conservative position stating that rebellions should be
reacted to with hardness. [11, 135]. When striking workers in the
airship dockyard appealed to him in 1910, Zeppelin showed little un-
derstanding for their demands. Quite the opposite was actually the
case - he expressed disappointment about the worker’s attempt to
hold up their employer. These episodes depict the influence of his
noble lineage once more. Much like a manorial lord, while he was a
caring employer, his expectations in loyalty and allegiance were high.
In this context, his turning towards the entire people in hope for help
for his project is to be evaluated; especially his despicable comment
quoted above should not be overrated. While appearing arrogant at
first (and it might have been meant that way), it might also have been
meant in a way that would fit better to Zeppelin’s interpretation of
higher social status coming along with a bigger responsibility. If this
was the case and Zeppelin was serious when talking about pursuing
his project for the well-being of his fatherland - it could also be meant
in a different way: he might have felt it a pity he was relying on the
general public as he did not perceive it their duty to enforce such
project. This way the remark could refer to the necessity for the work-
ing class to do what the upper classes could or would notes do hence
being an appreciation more than a notion of arrogance.
6.4 the mood changed
One other reason for Zeppelin’s sudden success that I have not re-
ally mentioned so far is an obvious: all of a sudden, his technology
appeared to work. Working in this context means that LZ-4s flights
in the summer of 1908 - the test ride over Switzerland as well as
the 24-hour test ride were much different than the flights of prior
prototypes. They were longer and went over greater distances than
Zeppelin had travelled with his airships before. Especially the tour
over Switzerland made the vision of the zeppelin technology as a re-
liable instrument appearing realistic. Before that, his prototypes all
suffered from technical problems and a lack of power that made them
very vulnerable to the elements. With the several hundred-kilometer
trip over Switzerland, the potential of Zeppelin’s machine as visible
for the first time. While my work concentrates on other factors of the
technology’s increasing popularity, this factor is certainly important.
Not only was it a prerequisite of any imagination becoming real for
the technology to work and the airship to fly steadily; it was also
a great facilitator of envisioning in the first place. While of course
the technology to be working is not a sufficient reason for it to be
popular and supported (we would be speaking technological deter-
minism, then), it surely helped. »Disappearance« of a »problem« is
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not bound to, but can consist of technological progress. While the
increased performance that was demonstrated by LZ-4 in comparison
to its predecessors did not necessarily cause excitement, it took one
argument from Zeppelin’s critics.
Also, the societal climate towards flight had turned. After the
Wright brothers’ maiden flight in 1903, the issue re-gained attention
and confidence. The aeroplane developed relatively fast. The dirigi-
ble, however, took slower steps. Nevertheless both developments tied
up with the aggressive German foreign politics: soon after the emer-
gence of powered aeroplanes, the English Channel crossing became
the most ambitious goal for European pioneers of flight. The British
newspaper ’Daily Mail’ offered a prize for the first to achieve this
goal, triggering a race of various inventors for the money, which was
eventually won by French Louis Blériot. The English Channel was
thus not reserved to German ideas of flights - it was a universal idea
that Britain’s eternal strategic advantage of its insular location would
soon undergo changes. On the airship side, however, things had not
moved just as quickly: due to the greater complexity of building pro-
totypes, fewer pioneers did actually try. In Germany, th discourse
was two-sided: the first one was whether airships had great potential
in the first place. The second one was which type of airship would
be the best one. There were three major designs, rigid, semi-rigid
and non-rigid airships, all advertised by their inventors as the best
solution. Zeppelin thus faced harsh competition and saw himself
as frequently discriminated against in comparison to his competitors
due to the resentments of the government against his person. De
Syon gives a very comprehensive summary of this discourse [9]. In
summary, one can state that Zeppelin „won“ the dispute simply by
becoming so popular. And while his competitors, especially Parseval,
did have some success in constructing and selling airships of their
types, no one could even come close to the meaning the Zeppelin de-
signs attained. All of them, however, profited from French pioneers:
While the start of the French Lebaudy-airship in 1903 was seen with
calm, by 1906 a perceived »airship gap« De Syon [9, 30] with France
led to increasing support for German airship builders - along with
the developments in foreign politics, the government did not want to
risk the enemy to make advances it might not be able to compensate.
This perceived airship gap in combination with the lack of success
of the naval armament led to a slow change in politics shifting some
attention and funds towards airship construction.
Further, Zeppelin’s public relations work was orchestrated very
well in the summer of 1908. The first ascents of LZ-4 had already
been covered by newspapers. Then the Swiss cruise surprised not
only Switzerland, but also the world. As this trip had not been an-
nounced, there were no expectations towards the machine and the
unexpected success was reacted to just as amazed. The trip was a me-
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dia event in multiple perspectives as it offered a multitude of exciting
features. First of all, its performance was, measured by contemporary
standards, impressive (e.g. [5, 32]) Second, it was the first time an air-
ship or a plane crossed a national border - moreover unannounced,
which led to Swiss protests. Third, it led over the Alps, which were
considered very difficult terrain to fly over. And last but not least, fly-
ing over Swiss spa towns was interpreted as a message to the interna-
tional high society that was gathered there and sending a message all
around the world. For all these reasons, the trip over Switzerland was
reflected as a sensation in contemporary newspapers. Zeppelin not
only became nationally respected, but internationally known within
a day.
Figure 11: ’The national donation for
Zeppelin’
Accounts by author Emil Sandt whom I men-
tioned above did their part. He had been taken
on board by Zeppelin for the Swiss cruise and
delivered enthusiastic representations of the trip.
Even more so, the German public looked forward
excitedly to the 24-hour test. Finally, it was per-
ceived, they were all to see the great German in-
ventor and his work. Consequently, the awareness
for Zeppelin’s project was as high as it could pos-
sibly be when the test in August of 1908 finally
arrived. Consequently, on August 4th, 1908 all
of Germany was spellbound by the attempted 24
hour endurance test. »Old-timers compared the
patriotic hoopla to the excitement that had accom-
panied the declaration of war against France in the
summer of 1870. The two, three, and even four
daily editions put out by metropolitan newspa-
pers at the time narrated the unfolding drama in
the breathless prose that suited the brash new cen-
tury [...] As the zeppelin approached - appearing
over jubilant crowds [. . . ] - as many as a quarter of
a million Germans streamed into Mainz [. . . ]« [16,
9]. Even more emotional are accounts in the newspaper „Schwäbis-
cher Merkur“ from Stuttgart, Capital of Württemberg: »The streets
filled up, people clambered onto rooftops. And one waits, patiently
waits for another hour! And then after the long silence, the crowd
cries out. [...] a silver, glimmering, wondrous entity appears. [. . . ]
One feels its power; we are overcome by a nervous trembling as we
follow the flight of the ship in the air. As only with the greatest
artistic experiences, we feel ourselves uplifted. Some people rejoice,
others weep.« (cited and translated by Fritzsche [16, 13]) And last
but not least, it has to be said that an aspect of the sudden success
of Zeppelin and the great support he received after the Echterdin-
gen crash were not even his merit. Partly, Zeppelin seems to have
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been tertius gaudens of an entirely different conflict; the inner po-
litical frictions that were at play at the time between large propor-
tions of the German people and the Prussian government in Berlin
may very well have been Zeppelin’s cause independently from peo-
ple’s favor for it. The title page from Simplicissimus seen above (Fig-
ure 11) is a very nice illustration for this motion: While clearly con-
nected with Zeppelin and his airships, the conflict it depicts is one
in which Zeppelin does not even take part, standing with the back
to the scene. It is a conflict between the German people, depicted by
the common depiction as the German Michel, and the Prussian ad-
ministration depicted by a uniformed man looking a lot like emperor
Wilhelm II. Yet it seems not Zeppelin is the one the depicted Wil-
helm steals from, put the people are the “victims”. Zeppelin stands
nearby not seeming to be too involved, it is the other two parties
that are the focus of this depiction of the conflict. In the time during
and shortly after the Volksspende, the self confidence about the com-
mon achievement of raising such great funds grew into a significant
pride - and by symbolically giving the technology back to the peo-
ple, Zeppelin had even strengthened this feeling of ownership and
accomplishment. Hence the zeppelin was seen as an artifact that was
commonly owned and had been created „bottom up.“ The correspon-
dent of the ’Bremer Nachrichten’ cited above by Fritzsche[16, 34] is
further cited »Those „at the top“ simply never understand, the doctor
[the correspondent, T.K.] concluded, that „it works without them too,
if the people want.« A Frankfurt newspaper is cited as »its message
was loud and clear: „Berlin: Hands off“.« [16, 34] and the further,
»the influential Schwäbischer Merkur honored the spontaneous patri-
otism and resolution of zeppelin enthusiasts and noted that the sub-
scription had taken place without „help from above.“ Germans want
to feel „self-reliant“ in their patriotic activity, the editors concluded.«
(ibd.) This self-reliance had been achieved through the reciprocal ex-
change of money and in turn the symbolic reception of the airship.
The airship had thereby become a token for the aptitude of people to
act apart from or even against the Prussian government. »For them,
the zeppelin became a national treasure that was far more appealing
and better suited to Germany’s industrious burghers than the Hohen-
zollern crown or the Prussian army. The immense public excitement
[. . . ] celebrated not only the imposing technical accomplishments of
the zeppelin but also the construction of a heart-felt and popular na-
tionalism. Zeppelin enthusiasm served the grand idea of a nation in
which all social classes were reconciled.« [16, 11] Fritzsche gives lots
of credit to the zeppelin here. One could also argue that these mo-
tions of a bottom-up movement were partly independent from Zep-
pelin and his dirigibles: Some modern commentators interpret them
as a revolutionary tendency that had been lacking in Germany to this
point. Reinicke even goes as far as speaking of the Zeppelin craze
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and the related events as being for Germany what the storm of the
Bastille had been for France - a uniting common experience of the
people exercising power. And while the comparison with the storm
on the Bastille may sound somewhat bit far-fetched, similar but less
elevated interpretations are quite common. One, for example, is the
perception that the Zeppelin craze was one first event of German jin-
goism that would find its continuation in the excitement with which
Germans went into World War 1 and lay the corner stone of the Nazis
populist appeal. In this context, the zeppelin enthusiasm can be seen
as the proverbial final straw as well as the stage existing frictions
between the Prussian monarchy and the people were acted upon.
An aspect of all these momentums that is very important as it is a
unifying momentum in all of them is their orientation towards the fu-
ture: the subduing of the air as a form of cultural progress (whether
interpreted as an opportunity to serve as a weapon or to serve peace-
ful tasks) as well as the praise for Zeppelin and the conflict of the
people and the monarchy all show a pursuit of a different future. It is
not so much the immediate impact the zeppelin is expected to have,
but the changes it is hoped to initiate that people appeal to. While the
notion ‘progress’ is itself oriented towards the future, the societal fric-
tions coming to light in both the adoration for Zeppelin as well as the
skepticism against the emperor and the stress on the independence
of the national donation from government influences called for a new
bourgeois self-esteem. Interestingly, those different meanings the air-
ship took and different functions the engagement for it fulfilled could
all be described as different interpretations in terms of Bijker’s inter-
pretative flexibility. However, they all can also be seen as »collectively
imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design
and fulfillment of [. . . ] scientific and/or technological projects.« [27,
120]– thus fulfilling the criteria of being a STI. Moreover, the entirety
of national aspirations the zeppelin triggered meet the second feature
Jasanoff described as feature characteristic of a STI. Having been com-
pared to the storm on the Bastille in 1789 appeared far-fetched. Most
certainly, however, the zeppelin was able to »encode and reinforce
particular conceptions of what a nation stands for«. [27]

Part III
D I SCUSS ION AND RESULTS

7
RESULTS & CONCLUS ION
In this last chapter, I will summarize my findings and conclude on
whether or not I am able to answer the research questions which to
answer I began this thesis for. Furthermore, as mentioned above, I
will reflect on the theoretic approaches I used and both what they
contributed to my research and if my research has implications for
their further use and development.
7.1 findings
First of all, it became apparent which great influence the public re-
lations work Zeppelin did had on the perception of his technology
as well as its development. While the ’socialness’ of technology de-
velopment was mostly limited to contributing funds, the importance
of this inherently social function can as was shown not be stressed
enough. The creation of public attention was one major factor on the
process of technological development in this case. In this context it
could be shown how timing and orchestration of this process played
a major role for it to show the desired effects. When talking about
the ’socialness’ being limited to contributing funds, however, this is
not meant to belittle the influence of social dynamics on the develop-
ment of the zeppelin. Much more it is meant to say it did not pose
a social influence in the engineering or the construction of the arti-
fact. Instead, there was a lively and lengthy debate about whether
or not to support count Zeppelin and his project and its potential
consequences.
This debate was not only initiated but also somewhat controlled
by Zeppelin. In a number of ways he addressed different forms of
the public - often through talks he gave to potential supporters of
his ambitions. In these talks, he adjusted the emphasis on different
features of his dirigibles to the (sub)public he addressed. In front
of the colonial society, for example, he stressed the potential to com-
municate with overseas location at previously unimaginable speed.
Thereby, he encouraged these audiences to develop their own visions
of what the zeppelin could facilitate and serve for according what
they considered important. However, those specific STI sometimes
caused troubles: As shown in chapter 6.1, when narrowing the poten-
tial application down to certain applications, different groups might
disagree whether that particular feature or potential application was
to be embraced or despised.
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As these conflicts emerged, what might have been a step to closure
(the framing as a weapon system that both the left and conservatives
shared) turned out to form a conflict that would prevent closure in
the question whether or not to support Zeppelin. Too crucial were the
values the STI carried along: implicate assumptions about peaceful or
aggressive foreign politics, to name the example I used in chapter 6.1.
Since this stabilization attempt had proven unfruitful, Zeppelin
changed his tactic. He took one step back and left the application of
his technology open. Not carrying along certain conceptions of for-
eign politics, the STIs related to the zeppelin were now about progress
and innovation, values that were more broadly to be agreed on as it
remained open for the individual to envision what ’progress’ entailed
in particular.
This second attempt to promote the dirigible was much more suc-
cessful. As the analysis has shown, the concept of rehearsals by Felt
that was introduced in the theory chapter has proven valuable here.
The history of the zeppelin shows nicely how a STI is not simply
there or appears out of the blue. Much more, it forms in a stabiliza-
tion process that is realized by social events Felt calls rehearsals. As
the analysis has shown, the transfer of experiences from different re-
hearsals and the connectedness of different STI were a crucial step in
the zeppelin development; the reaction and continuation of the STI
about aviation and German nationhood were crucial elements for the
zeppelin to be perceived as an appreciated technology.
In the zeppelin case, rehearsals were numerous. There were talks
given by Zeppelin, press coverage, appeals by Zeppelin to the public
and so forth. As I was able to show in my analysis, it took Zeppelin
years and multiple rounds of rehearsals to adapt the image he gave
his invention to what would find broad acceptance in the public. The
comparison of early attempts to establish a stabilized perception with
the later successful ones in 1908 additionally revealed how sensitive
such a construction process to the right timing.
It was that combination of unique features of both SCOT and STI
- the precise destinction of social groups as recipients of Zeppelin’s
promotion effort and the richness of what an imagination about tech-
nology includes - that made the combination of those two approaches
so valuable.
Several factors in this stabilization are of particular concern for
someone interested in the social construction of technology. First
of all, it is extremely interesting to see to which degree the public
interest in the technology depended on ’business cycles’: While the
interest in the zeppelin was great in 1900, Zeppelin’s appeal in 1903
created almost no interest at all - and in 1908 when flying and its
imaginations experienced a new boom public attention was stronger
than ever. This shows nicely how technological innovations have their
time and can just as well find no resonance because of bad timing.
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From the technological side, the development of the zeppelin could
have gone much faster. Between the attempts in 1903 and 1908, the
technology had not changed a whole lot. What had changed and fa-
cilitated a new opportunity was the public interest in it. When the
preparation of several rounds of rehearsals and the political and so-
cietal conditions were in unison, the STI related to the airship could
relate to people’s perceived needs (as well as the respective visions
and STI) eventually worked in Zeppelin’s favor.
Second, STI proved to be a very valuable concept to deal with the
zeppelin and the national sentiments related to it. Indeed, the re-
hearsals of the zeppelin worked mostly through visions about what
the airship could once become. Jasanoff’s intention of opening up
social concerns about technology to considerations about possible fu-
tures contributes to the understanding of the phenomenon. After all,
one has to note that the first real breakthrough for the zeppelin had
been only in the immediate past of the Echterdingen crash; while
Zeppelin had been promoting his project for many years, up to the
summer of 1908 he had only very little to show. While lighter-than-
air flight was apparently possible, his prototypes had also shown that
it was very difficult to control. This control was first convincingly
demonstrated by Zeppelin’s cruise over Switzerland in 1908 – a kind
of public proof in Latour’s sense. Respectively, one has to admit that
while Zeppelin’s vision and narrative about his invention were at the
time already quite old and known, the actual technological artifact
that made his promises appear somewhat realistic was a very young
one. Likewise was the entirely open conceptualization in the promo-
tion of the technology and its focus on the normative notion progress
instead of applications. And as it was still a long way to go (in the
end the great zeppelins that came close to Zeppelin’s dreams and ex-
pectations and are still remembered today needed another 20 years
to develop), the support for his endeavor came at a technologically
rather early point in time. To come back to the distinction made by
Krajewski I cited above, the zeppelin was still a project, not yet a
product. It was but the public support that allowed for Zeppelin to
achieve the tipping of this crucial scale into the right direction. The
newly-gained unity of people in the act of supporting Zeppelin and
the demonstration of what a collective people was capable of then
led to a very strong national sentiment. The apparent power to give
such enormous impulses and the subsequent optimism for the future
development of the zeppelin fired all sorts of imaginaries of how a
bright and shining future was to look like.
In her seminal work on the relation of national identity and tech-
nology in France, Hecht came to similar conclusions concerning the
national attributions of technology. She articulated that
"national-identity discourse is not about the past per se or
about the present. It is about the future. National-identity
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discourse constructs a bridge between mythologized past
and coveted future. Nations and their supposedly essen-
tial characteristics are imagined through a telos, in which
the future appears as the inevitable fulfillment of histori-
cally legitimate destiny." [20, 255]
Once we take the results of strong nationalistic sentiment in Germany
in the 20th century into consideration, this notion of course gets a
slightly different touch. While this thought is certainly not completely
off, the classic question »Does Technology Drive History?« [46] should
probably not be taken too seriously at that point - too many factors
worked into that as to attribute too much to the zeppelin at this point.
It became visible through my study how important the framing of
a new technology and the imaginaries of it can be for its reception in
public spaces. Zeppelin’s early attempts of marketing a new weapon
system was met with little response. Opening up the conception of
the zeppelin, the airship became a lot more agreeable. Thus from
excluding anyone not particularly fond of the imagination of a new
German weapon, through the shift to a technology that marked a
progress for humankind and enabled the „conquest of air“ became
very inclusive. As the notion of progress was a shared one at the time,
anyone could join in on the zeppelin excitement. Which applications
to expect from the technology once it was ready remained in the eye
of the beholder thus leaving the opportunity to block out unfavorable
imaginations and focus their own interpretation on their visions of
what ’progress’ should entail.
In the process of promoting the technology it became apparent how
proficient this creation of an image was managed. However one can
draw the conclusion that Zeppelin was apparently as much a talented
spin-doctor as he was an inventor. The notion of the »heterogeneous
engineer«, shortly introduced in chapter 4.4, seems all the more fit-
ting now. Although Hughes [22, 58] explicitely mentions Zeppelin
in the context along with Edison, the Wright brothers and others, to
my knowledge this notion has not been worked on in the Zeppelin
context before. Zeppelin was probably the most heterogeneous engi-
neer imaginable - he didn’t even really construct the airships. From
early on, hired engineers did the actual engineering work for him.
Zeppelin was the one having an idea and then driving its realization
- he got out of the actual construction work shortly after the very ini-
tial thoughts and became designer, supervisor, manager, fundraiser,
promoter and probably many things more. In short, he was much
more a »system-« [34, 112] than an actual airship builder. Neverthe-
less, nowadays whenever something looking even slightly similar to
a zeppelin is in view, people point at it and call it zeppelin (imagine
a pointing at a Dell computer and calling it a Mac - people would
most likely mock you for that). The zeppelin managed to culturally
become the technological artifact people think of when encountering
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all sorts of lighter-than-air vehicles that ar not actually Zeppelins, but
e.g. blimps. Even the modern Zeppelin NT, built by the Zeppelin
company today, is not actually not a rigid-hull dirigible but a semi-
rigid design, which at the time was Zeppelin’s strongest competition.
No one, however, would ever consider calling it anything but a zep-
pelin. Too iconic is its design.). While it is clear that not all agency
that I attributed to him in this piece was actually himself, he certainly
was the most central figure amongst all those who did these things
with him. The same can be stated for the actions referred to in this
work. While probably not all of it was accounted for by Zeppelin
himself, he obviously managed well and knew how to make the right
decisions.
I want to mention one further issue that came up during my anal-
ysis. The influence of the inner-political conflicts in Germany at the
time were a phenomenon that I was not aware of initially. While
they are mentioned by all the chroniclers, they are not given much
space as they would deflect attention from the zeppelin and Count
Zeppelin himself. I do think, however, that the political climate pro-
vided an important part to the breakthrough of the zeppelin. After
all the mood and the common feeling of dissatisfaction with the Prus-
sian government and emperor Wilhelm II in particular seems to have
been a fertile soil for the zeppelin enthusiasm. And not only that -
one could even interpret the extent to which Zeppelin was supported
as not so much an act of support for Zeppelin but primarily an act
of protest against the Wilhelminian monarchy. From this perspective,
the events I described gain an entirely new dimension: while those
motivations and actors certainly do provide to the social construction
of the technology, the social construction in this case is in this respect
not really related to the technology itself.
In that sense the argument about the technology in question is just
one arena to fight a conflict that had been latent before and is subse-
quently fought over a matter that is not necessarily its root but simply
provides and opportunity for the conflict to become active. Thus, the
support (in the zeppelin case most likely parts of it) is not necessarily
to be accounted for as being directed for the particular technology
but against its political adversaries. The zeppelin, in this angle, was
parasitic (meant in Serres’ way) to the political conflicts of the time.
This dimension opens up the political implications technological ar-
tifacts carry along and that has, to my knowledge, not been touched
a lot by SCOT. It became apparent rather late during my analysis.
The possibility of the support for the zeppelin not necessarily being
directed to the zeppelin but to the Prussian aristocracy came to my
mind only when I reflected upon the nationalistic spirits of the time
and the political consequences of Zeppelin’s success. To my knowl-
edge the STS field lacks an elaborate consideration of this aspect of
technology development. Of course there are works that deal with
88 results & conclusion
the relation between artifacts and politics, however I believe techno-
logical development as a by-product and arena of political conflict
has not been dealt with explicitly.
The closest to that is the notion »Technopolitics« by Gabrielle Hecht
[20, 19] - that moreover originates from the same areas of interest, the
relation of national identity and technological conceptions. While
her description that those as »strategic practice of designing or using
technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals« [20, 256]
suggests a pretty good fit, I am not sure whether it really fits. I had a
somewhat different impression of what (at least er famous case about
nuclear energy in France) she was aiming at - in her case, the dispute
was in a relatively closed environment.
She refers to the notion »technological system« by Hughes [23, 22]
inside which those technopolitics unfold. [20, 257] This implies that
there always has to be a technological ’center’ of the conflict of sorts
- in her example, the conflict would not have been able to take place
in just any environment as the technology itself and the options it
opened let the conflict emerge in the first place. Thereby, the technol-
ogy is not, as in the zeppelin case, an arena for a conflict that was
preexistent as such but the conflict emerged and had to be settled
within the system. That is a crucial difference to the zeppelin case for
which, I think, Hecht’s notion is not an ideal fit.
Moreover, while the case Hecht describes was for sure political, the
circles in which it was discussed seemed to be rather small to me:
the 4000 to 6000 protesters she mentions [20, 284] do not quit e com-
pare to the masses involved in the zeppelin example. Moreover, I
had the impression that Hecht’s nuclear case was not as much about
the invocation of a national identity. Neither was it such a profound
statement of a different opinion concerning present conditions but
more a negotiation and partial re-definition of nationhood. Maybe
Eckener’s bold comparison is right at this place: the French had al-
ready stormed the Bastille, the did not need »technopolitics« to serve
as their unifying momentum.
This is, by the way, an aspect of my case that personally I liked
very much: the zeppelin case involved the entire society and took ev-
erything from a somewhat ’bottom-up’ perspective. I perceived most
literature as somewhat ’top-down’; while of course in this discipline
usually acknowledging social influences, often cases are described
from the perspective of small, often elite groups, »framing the public
as the problem« [14, 4] is somewhat common. Problem not in a dra-
matical sense but as a variable that is rather difficult to integrate but
has to in some way. Whether the ’common people’ are disassembling
(and thereby de-scribing) ’fool-proof‘ lighting kits [1], discriminated
against with bridges [52] or whose nationhood is redefined through
elites’ discourses about how their society’s nuclear efforts[20] should
look like: hardly are the concerns of those affected by a technology in
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focus. Rather, they served as means to prove a point. I found it nice
to being able to take a somewhat different angle, which of course lies
in the historical narrative of my case.
7.2 reflection on theoretical frameworks
As mentioned in the initial theory section, I had looked for an oppor-
tunity to connect the established concept SCOT with the rather new
concept of STIs. In my eyes, as can be seen in the previous section,
this attempt was successful. The future-orientation of the hopes and
expectations for which people supported Zeppelin and his airships
has nicely shown how interpretations of a technology in a SCOT-sense
can not only refer to actual and existing relations of problems and so-
lutions but how these interpretations can also be a buy-in to in what a
technology offers in terms of potential to solve problems and produce
change.
Moreover, the inclusion of imaginations about the future entitle the
interpretation not only to be oriented towards interests, as Jasanoff
[26, 20] criticized but entail normative concepts about how the world
should look like and what would be steps into the right direction. It
resolves the critcism by Jasanoff that the conception of closure boiled
down the stabilization process to a process of negotiation of social
interest without regarding the inherent history of positions as those
normative claims opinions about how the world should look like are
of course inherently social and carry the history of its beholder. As
the notion STI is not limited to an interpretation of the technological
side of an artifact, but sees the artifact as part of a ’sociotechnical’ en-
tity, it embodies normative visions and imaginations about the world
someone having a particularly STI shares. The example of the po-
litical left despising the zeppelin as a weapon system, for instance,
embodied their imagination that war was a concept of the past that
a ’progressive’ human race should neglect in the first place thus de-
signing weapons went contrary to this very basic conviction. Thus
the application of STI was both important and fruitful in the case at
hand. It has proven a worthwhile addition to SCOT and opened levels
of analysis previously out of reach. When oriented in such a way act-
ing upon the interpretative flexibility of a technology does not only
appear similar to but to actually be a STI. Thus STIs can be seen as
one form which interpretative flexibility can take.
The entire study emphasized the value of Felt’s efforts to shed light
not only in the mere existence but the emergence of interpretations and
imaginations, an intention that aims in into the same direction. Here,
too, it can be stated that a convergence of the concept of assemblages
Felt developed with SCOT’s concept of stabilization is one possibility
to make observations. Especially, the introduction of the rehearsal
level and thereby opening a space for analyzing the actual process
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of stabilizing in new detail proved valuable. This was not really well
articulated in SCOT and the concept provides additional framework
for analysis.
Moreover, the rehearsal concept allows for the integration of pre-
vious experience into the construction of a particular STI: the consid-
eration towards the zeppelin were of course based not just on the
discourse about the airship, but included previous and contempo-
rary discourses implicitly. This, too, is a way to include historic ex-
periences and culture into the discourse about technologies and its
stabilization: the experiences the public hade made with the German
fleet armament program, for example, contributed to social democrat
fears of a new armament program directed to a fleet of military air-
ships. These considerations would not make much sense without the
other.
When stepping back a bit from the analysis I made and reflecting
on the initial theoretical conception, an interesting observation can be
made. What I mentioned to be a flaw of SCOT in chapter 4, the unidi-
rectional approach of SCOT not mentioning the influence technology
has on society can be resolved. When stepping away from the zep-
pelin as a singular artifact and looking at the entirety of the German
society and its relation to the zeppelin, we can basically use nation-
hood as a frame and view the entirety as a »sociotechnical ensemble«
[3] that was co-produced by society and technology. So Bijker’s attempt
to adapt SCOT to a new time was somewhat successful. The use of STI
and the richness of description it carries has provided to that approx-
imation by not only moving SCOT to a larger scale, from a single ar-
tifact to technological frames towards a sociotechnical ensemble but
by providing more depth to the entire notion of what sociotechni-
cal means. While sociotechnical imaginaries were developed for the
particular perspective of looking on a national connotations of tech-
nology, I do not think the concept requires the national background.
This background could, in my opinion be any element constituting a
community, wheter it is ethnicity, origin, or whatever more criteria for
people to distinguish themselves from each other may be out there.
This would allow for both the concept of STI to come to a broader
set of applications as well as for SCOT. As the combination of the
SCOT-methodology with STI has proven fruitful here, this might be a
desirable step.
In retrospect, my theoretical conception has proven appropriate
to my topic. It was both suited to bring clarity into my research
question and itself profit from the case worked with it. Of course,
STS has a wide repertoire of different possibilities of describing tech-
nology. When Law was cited talking of »system-builders« one of
many descriptions other than simply calling it an ’artifact’ appeared.
His notion refers to the concept of technological systems by Thomas
P. Hughes [23, 22], in whose regards the zeppelin would have been
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a technological system that itself consisted of artifacts. Maybe even
more prominent would have been a description of the development
of and around the zeppelin as a heterogeneous network. ANT [34, 1]
is a prominent approach in STS, and while having contemplated de-
scribing my case as a heterogeneous network around the zeppelin as
a field of tensions between the people, the Prussian government and
Zeppelin (inspired by the drawing in Figure 11), I decided not to do
so. I found it more promising to use SCOT as I found it important to
focus on the interaction between the technical and the social. Partic-
ularly, the concept of interpretative flexibility appeared a better fit to
me than corresponding notions of inscribing and describing meaning
in ANT [1, 208 f.]. Therefore, the clear conception in SCOT of how the
social influences the technical through interpretations (or, as shown,
through imaginaries) and the clear three-step methodology appeared
to be better suited.

8
REFLECT ION , OUTLOOK AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
As a last piece in this thesis, I want to critically reflect on what was
not achieved, respectively which new questions emerged from what
I found out and give an outlook on how consecutive research could
look like.
While this case study was able to accomplish quite a bit of what
was hoped for, as any research it led to new questions and reached
points where its approach was limited and could not bring further
clarification.
One of those, and for me as the author the most apparent point
is the agency in all the events I described. In this study, the actions
taken by count Zeppelin are a central factor. I refer to him as a sin-
gular individual and attribute agency solely to him. Also, I assume
conscious and willing actions in great parts. While I do have reasons
for that and give sources that indicate these assumptions to be true,
they remain assumptions. There are two assumptions in this context
in particular that would benefit from profound scrutiny. First would
be the agency of Zeppelin. Zeppelin did, of course, not act alone.
At least after 1900, he had company and support by co-workers and
aids. There were both technical staff as Theodor Kober, who actually
constructed the first airships as well as administrative staff such as
Hugo Eckener who helped Zeppelin to promote the technology and
set up the institutional frame of his endeavor. Colsmann even refers
to a „Round Table“ (original quote: »Tafelrunde«, [8, 25 ff.] which
met every day for lunch and discussed all aspects of the technology.
This points to what I referred to as Zeppelin as an individual having
actually been the man himself and a group of advisors. As the only
actual witnesses to write about that time, Colsmann and Eckener, do
not talk about that in length, the issue remains opaque. For my the-
sis project, the point is not decisive and thus does no harm to my
study. It is however an interesting point and additionally as my work
remains imprecise at this point, I do not want to conceal it.
The second issue is the question for intentions. As much as for
Zeppelin’s agency, I assumed these actions I attributed to Zeppelin
to have been taken deliberately. Again, there are good reasons to be-
lieve that: the facts that with Hugo Eckener he hired a journalist to
become his closest advisor, the relations to Emil Sandt and the profi-
cient „management“ of his public relations. Especially Eckener’s role
is very interesting as he gained importance over time and eventu-
ally became Zeppelin’s successor. It can thus be assumed that it was
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not entirely Zeppelin who managed the process but that what was
attributed to Zeppelin in this piece of writing was at least in parts
also other men’s work. There are both accounts of Eckener being
very influential and Zeppelin himself being involved deeply into the
very details of his public relations accounts. The exact distribution of
agency is probably not going to see the light of day. As a consequence,
my work does not overcome the general limitations of dealing with
events lying far in the past. At this point, a limitation in the sources
used that I mentioned in the beginning shows its effect: the journals
of Count Zeppelin are probably the only source one would likely find
further indicators if the assumptions I made are correct or not. Until
they are made available, however, these assumptions are the closest I
could have gotten.
These issues are partly reflected on in the short take on the »hetero-
geneous engineer«, yet I think they would deserve further research.
One might even attempt to integrate a scrutiny of the heterogeneous
engieer Zeppelin with a comparative analysis on the two concepts
of the heterogeneous engineer and the projector. The latter being a
historic category that was, as mentioned, regarded with disdain, a
take on the development from projecting to heterogeneous engineer-
ing (and maybe even its continuation in what nowadays is celebrated
as ’entrepreneurship’) with Zeppelin as a case might be promising.
An issue that I was not able to shed too much light on either was
the personality and character of Zeppelin himself: while the existing
literature is exclusively positive, I was unable to verify this percep-
tion. As my work as well as others’ relies on biographies that are
already available, it can again al be traced back to Eckener’s glori-
fying narrative. During the research to this thesis, I at some point
had the impression Zeppelin was actually pretty hostile towards the
working class and his portrait required some adjustment. I had per-
ceived critical expressions by Zeppelin himself as more severe than
they may have actually been. As mentioned in the analysis, expres-
sions appearing arrogant and presumptuous do not necessarily have
to be meant as aggressive as they might be perceived today. With the
background of contemporary society they may have been quite nor-
mal. It is probably safe to say Zeppelin was far from fraternizing with
the working class - his noble lineage and upbringing would certainly
have prevented that. His self-perception as someone of higher status
does, however, not necessarily point to ignorance towards the work-
ing class but could as well be a perspective of responsibility. A clear
interpretation is not possible on the grounds of the present material.
This point, too, might benefit greatly from Zeppelin’s journals. Only
then could a critical evaluation of the very positive image of Zeppelin
in the discourse be done.
Another question that remains unanswered is to what extent the
social construction of the zeppelin by the German public was po-
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litically motivated. While I was able to show that there certainly
was some kind of influence, the question of how much of the sup-
port for Zeppelin was actually political and not really directed at the
technological development but the Prussian monarchy has to be left
unanswered. From a talk with the head of the Zeppelin Archives in
Friedrichshafen, Barbara Waibel, I learned that there has not been a
conclusive study containing detailed analyses about the actual dona-
tions, their amounts and the identities of their contributors – thus
their political affiliations, etc. remain unknown, too. She mentioned
it not being actually millions of very small donations but the majority
of the funds coming from rather big donations. This does not lead to
any conclusions and can at best serve as an indicator that for some,
the issue was very serious. It indicates, however, that a detailed study
about the actual Volksspende might be a rewarding endeavor.
Lastly I want to mention the sociology of expectation and the soci-
ology of futures as two fields that were disregarded in this thesis de-
spite their potential to contribute to it. These two strands of literature
would be a rewarding addition to the materials that were included in
this work. They would be able to contribute to the phenomenon of
imaginaries and why they may motivate people to action and what
expectations towards futures and the opportunity to change things
for a better future there actually are. This motivational character of
imaginations, hopes, dreams and visions has been taken for granted
in this piece. Nevertheless it would certainly be interesting what peo-
ple actually had in mind and what these particular imaginations con-
sisted of. Progress, a notion I used for that, has been left a black box
here that would be worth while opening. What was the ’German-
ness’ and the ’progress’ people thougt of? - partucularly the latter
was used with frequency just in the way it appeared in the historic
discourse, yet it was never really asked what stood behind it. What
actions did these conceptions trigger for what reason? These and oth-
ers are questions one could answer in greater detail when integrating
scientific literature about futures and expectations into research on
this issue. For the complexity of this topic in relation to the scope of
this thesis, however, this was not done in this place.
As mentioned above, the relatively new concept of STIs proved very
valuable in this case study. The perspective of hopeful prospects
could indeed be used to explain parts of the enthusiasm for Zeppelin
and his invention. It proved especially worthwhile, as at the time,
the zeppelin was still far from the functionality it was envisioned to
have. Quite differently to the common SCOT perspective, it was not
yet ready to solve any problems or facilitate great achievements. But
already when the first steps were taken towards a reliable artifacts
(as mentioned above, LZ-4 and especially the cruise over Switzerland
did mark a breakthrough in terms of reliability and stamina) people
bought into the story - far from it fulfilling any of the prophecies
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made by Zeppelin. As much as I hoped, my study could provide
the concept with a bottom up approach: it became clear that quite
contrary to the initial example by Jasanoff and Kim [27] the STI that
stabilized was not coined by a national authority and then spread. In-
stead, the dominating imaginary started its stabilization in the minds
of millions of citizens and reached closure through and ecstatic re-
ception of Zeppelin in Berlin as well as the admission of it by the
Prussian government acknowledging the successful development of
the zeppelin and its use in military service.
Both the ambitions in terms of contributing to the historical case of
the zeppelin as well as to some theories of STS were successful. Nev-
ertheless, as usual, new questions amerged and an entire collection
of starting points for consecutive research would be imaginable, as
stated above. The zeppelin remains a fascinating technology about
which books have been written yet not all stories have been told. Es-
pecially from an STS-perspective, it proved to be a very interesting
subject for research.
Part IV
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